THE BOOKS OF PETER C. SMITH


REFLECTIONS ON MIDWAY DAUNTLESS VICTORY.

Jacket1.

Without Fear or Favour (Work in Progress)

Some historians and naval officers maintain that Fletcher could have positioned his two Task Forces more advantageously on the morning of 4th June, and that, had he done so, some American aircraft and ship losses might have been minimised. [See for example http://blog.usni.org/?p=4507 ]Others angrily assert this is not the case. Both viewpoints have been included in my book, but the difference of opinion continues, so I am conducting further detailed research to try and establish the truth. The current evidence is as follows. [f/n 1]

It will help matters if I clarify certain basic terminology used in my book to simplify a complicated scenario. What is termed by myself, if not by others I quote, as “Nimitz’s Order” in my book, refers not only to CINCPAC OpOrder 29-42 of 27th May 1942, (Serial 0114W) [f/n 2] but , of equal importance, also to the decisions taken earlier during the formulation of this order. In its summary of probable enemy intentions, it clearly stated that it was estimated that preliminary attacks by enemy carriers would take place and that the enemy would favour, "a north-westerly bearing". It also spelt out [f/n 3] that: "It is probable that if our carriers are sighted early in the operation, they will become the primary object of the enemy carriers." In readiness for this Nimitz ordered, "Operate with Task Forces available initially to the northeast of Midway commencing thirty May, in order to seize opportunity to obtain initial advantage [f/n 4] against carriers which are employing their air groups against Midway." The accompanying Annex 'A' was a plan of the initial US submarine patrol areas, which should have left no doubt about which direction the Japanese were expected to attack from. The outer arc of submarines was stationed from 330 degrees from Midway round to 250 degrees, the centre arc from 360 degrees round to 240 degrees, the inner arc from 360 degrees to 315 degrees.

This Battle Plan was reinforced by the originator during the immediate lead-up phase to the battle, when the CINCPAC, Admiral Nimitz sent a signal to Admiral Fletcher reminding him that he should “insure" that his carrier task forces were, “...within early striking distance of objectives” [meaning of course the Japanese aircraft carriers]. That “striking distance” was, naturally and obviously [to most people], defined and dictated purely by the range of Fletchers shortest-reached carrier aircraft, the Grumman F4F Wildcat fighter, used as escort for the Douglas TBM Devastator torpedo-bomber and the Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers. That meant a strike would need to get close to the enemy carriers before launching, in order to enable a safe return. Therefore, although the actual locality might change, that ability to strike was strictly dependant upon whether Fletcher had his ships in a position to reach and hit the enemy before the enemy found him. It was clearly of no use mounting any such attack while still being beyond the range of his strike aircraft to reach the target and inflict damage. Also, the cardinal American advantages of early intelligence and surprise would have been lost to no avail. On the 3rd June Nimitz again reminded his Task Force Commanders that this was still the desired plan, stating that, "The situation is developing as expected" and re-emphasised, "Carriers our most important objective [f/n 5] should soon be located...", and he urged them on the next day, "...give them the works". [f/n 6]

Briefly, then, the term Nimitz’s ‘Desired Position’ is used throughout my book as an alternative to, and totally synonymous with, Nimitz’s original order as decided upon during the crucial Joint Conference held at Pearl Harbor on the evening of 27th May. Among the officers attending Admiral Nimitz at this crucial meeting were Admirals Milo F. Draemel, (Nimitz's Chief-of-Staff) [f/n 7], Fletcher, Spruance, Commander Edwin T. Layton (Intelligence), Joseph J Rochefort (Intelligence, who arrived late), Operations Officers Captain Lynde D. McCormick (CINCPAC War Plans Officer)[f/n 8], Commander William H. Buracker (Task Force 16) [f/n 9] and Commander Walter G. Schindler (Task Force 17) [f/n 10] as well as Generals Delos B. Emmons and Robert C. Richardson. Historian Elmer Belmont Potter has recorded in his biography of Nimitz [f/n 11], how these officers decided at this meeting that:- "It was assumed that the Japanese Striking Force would begin launching at dawn- attack planes southward toward Midway, search planes north, east, and south. At that hour the American task forces, on course southwest through the night, should be 200 miles north of Midway, ready to launch [f/n 12] on receiving the first report from U.S. search planes of the location, course, and speed of the enemy."

In view of the fact that Potter was in direct contact with Nimitz when writing this biography, that statement surely ought to be clear enough and Nimitz's himself an original enough source for anyone! Nor was it exactly confined to the top brass, as Ensign Ralph "Kaiser" Wilhem [13], the pilot of one of the heavy cruiser Portland's scouting aircraft, recorded in his private diary on Wednesday 3rd June, that at the time they first received reports of the Japanese attack on the Aleutians, "...we were about 350 miles north of Midway steaming north. Shortly after, we turned south and are now heading for a point 200 miles north of Midway at which we should arrive at 0600 tomorrow morning." [14] Rochefort himself recorded that, "...it was obvious when Nimitz sent for me that he had already decided on his course of action. His operational orders were set and the matter closed. My appearance at this final staff meeting was to ensure that everyone was thinking alike." [f/n 15] Nimitz had therefore used this agreed "200 miles north of Midway" position as the basis for his Battle Plan. Layton recorded that at this final staff conference, "...which set the seal on our Midway defense plan", Admiral Nimitz, far from being unclear just where "over the whole vast Pacific Ocean" the Japanese would appear (as it alleged by some), actually, "...gave the impression of being thoroughly confident that the Japanese would appear when and where I had predicted."[f/n 16] John Lundstrom, in the opening lines of Chapter Fifteen of his book The First Team, stated that- "First light (around 0430) was to see Striking Force at a point bearing 013 degrees, 202 miles from Midway. This constituted the famous flank ambush position planned by Nimitz, Fletcher and Spruance." [f/n 17].

Far from leaving his subordinates, Fletcher and Spruance, in any doubt of what was required of them, once a plan of action was agreed upon, then Nimitz was decisive. One modern assessment of Nimitz agrees with Layton's analysis of Nimitz qualities in this respect. "Having a management style that encouraged his subordinate officers to share their views should not be confused with a committee where the majority ruled. After making up his mind, Admiral Nimitz would leave no doubt as to who was in charge." [f/n 18] As proof of this, Nimitz's subsequent signals continually re-emphasised to his Task Force commanders the need for the American carriers to be so placed that, on the enemy being sighted, the US carriers would subsequently quickly be able to reach that desired, “early striking distance”, or to give it an alternate title, the Optimum Launch Position. All these labels, despite other interpretations recently placed upon them, merely mean the best possible point from which TF16/TF17 could be put so that as little time as possible existed between the confirmation of the enemy position and the actually launch of their crucial initial air strikes against the Japanese carrier force attacking Midway Island, in order to inflict the maximum damage upon them, while ensuring their own minimum loss. This would involve the Americans getting within striking range without being sighted and attacked; difficult because the Japanese aircraft had a longer reach.

Nimitz’s Operational Order 29-42, promulgated 27th May 1942, which is the Nimitz Order that I refer to throughout my book, and not any other, gave the predicted Japanese rendezvous point. [f/n 19] Knowledge that the Zuikaku would certainly not be included in the Midway strike was received on 31st May. [f/n 20], and despite ONI’s subsequent inclusion of her in the Japanese plan, Nimitz himself dismissed the idea totally, and refused to pass this estimate on to either Fletcher or Spruance. This OpPlan followed the cracking by Station Hypo of the Japanese Date Cipher, the missing link in solving Yamamoto's scheme for Midway, which took place on 25th May. This gave Rochefort's team the ability to confidently predict that the Japanese would hit the Aleutians on the 3rd June and Midway itself on the 4th June. Nimitz fully accepted these dates for his own final preparations.

The original inter-relationship between the two carrier Task Force Commanders controlling Task Force 16 (Halsey) and Task Force 17 (Fletcher) respectively, had originally been spelt out in CINCPAC's Operational Plan [f/n 21], which now required modification. But one thing that certainly remained constant and immutable was the crucial matter of timing, i.e. when best to hit the enemy. This “striking distance of objectives” (i.e. the enemy carriers), or “Desired Position” or “Optimum Launch Position” [f/n 22] has been given no actual positional co-ordinates in my book because it had none, and it had none simply because Nimitz could not fix a Latitude and Longitude for this “Desired Position” in advance (how could he) but left it to his subordinate, Admiral Fletcher, in overall command of both Task Forces, to select for himself, according to dictates and conditions of the situation that he found himself in, but Nimitz did reiterate the obvious, it had to be within, “striking distance” of the enemy, which still, therefore, had to mean the original agreed 200 miles north of Midway in order to be of any use. The experienced naval aviator, Arthur Cayley "Art" Davis, Admiral Nimitz's air-warfare advisor, also counselled during planning that it was, "particularly important that the carriers be able to take action at the earliest possible moment." [f/n 23] Nimitz himself specified that it was of the utmost importance that the enemy carrier force was, "...promptly attacked." [f/n 24] The absolute minimum delay between a confirmed sighting and the attack going in was what was required from CINCPAC in his orders to his subordinate Task Force commanders.

To "Brown Shoe" Navy Aviators, (of whatever nation), hitting the enemy carriers before they could hit yours was their basic creed. There was nothing new or revolutionary in this as far as the flyers themselves were concerned, although Fletcher may not have had the same degree of awareness as they. If he did, then it was as a very late convert, for having failed Flight Training Medical in 1928, Fletcher had become a firm member of the "Gun Club". One contemporary, who was himself the most ardent advocate of naval aviation, John H. Towers, [f/n 25] is on record as telling wife, that, on aviation matters, Fletcher, "....doesn't know what he's talking about. It's no use discussing it." [f/n 26] Clark Reynolds also reported that Fletcher persistently denigrated naval aviation during cocktail chatter before the war. Even after Midway, Fletcher's six-page resume of carrier operations, which he sent to Nimitz, included the statement, "A carrier task force should turn and as soon as possible run away at high speed from an impending air attack" [f/n 27], a viewpoint which, whatever its merits in some battle circumstances, did not endear him to the "Brown Shoe" school of thought.

The difference in thinking between the "Black Shoe" remarks quoted above and the "Brown Shoe" attitude to air fighting may perhaps be reflected in the comment made by Souek's replacement as Air Officer aboard the Hornet after Midway had been fought. Commander Marcel E A Gouin [f/n 25], a former dive-bomber pilot, on being challenged by a non-flying officer after the despatch of an air striking force that this force was not strong enough, merely remarked, "We're in this business to take risks" [f/n 29] and walked away.

This pro-aviation faction had very different views from the surface ship sailors. Towers frequently proclaimed that carrier doctrine should be based on mounting their attacks on the enemy "...as early as possible, and as often as possible..." [f/n 30] As long ago as August 1924, Commander Patrick Nielson Lynch Bellinger, USN, had delivered a Confidential Lecture to the Naval War College outlining this basic naval air warfare doctrine. [f/n 31] Much of what he stated then was still totally relevant almost eighteen years later at Midway. For example he stated:-

"It is sometimes stated that the defense against aircraft is aircraft, but this should not be taken too literally when planning a campaign in the air. An aircraft is primarily an offensive weapon, [f/n 32] it has only the period of its endurance in which to accomplish is mission, and if it fails to take advantage of any and every opportunity to do all the damage within its power, against the enemy, during this short life, it will have failed in its maximum accomplishment. "The defense may repulse the enemy but only the attack can annihilate him." Again, "The value of aircraft action on the defensive as a protective group against enemy aircraft is doubtful..." An obsession with holding back most of the fighter aircraft for the defence of his carriers marked the several early phases of the Midway battle by surface-ship orientated commanders.

Bellinger had continued, defining the cardinal point of carrier warfare:-

"The most effective defensive against air attack is offensive action against the source, that is, enemy vessels carrying aircraft and therefore, enemy aircraft carriers."

He added: "The air force that first strikes [f/n 33] its enemy a serious blow will reap a tremendous initial advantage. The opposing force cannot hope to surely prevent such a blow by the mere placing of aircraft in certain protective screens or by patrolling certain areas. There is no certainty, even with preponderance in numbers, of making contact with enemy aircraft, before they have reached the proper area and delivered their attack, and there is no certainty if contact is made, of being able to stop them."

Another highly pertinent point, so strikingly proven on 4th June 1942, was this. "For obvious reasons only planes of the same type, with the same characteristics, and with the same mission, should be assigned together in the same flight." It may have been obvious in 1924, but nonetheless this was ignored in 1942 by all save Halsey, and he was incapacitated at Midway. Other points well made included, "When such a flight or group of flights starts out for its objective in accordance with its previously assigned task, it is not believed that it could effectively be diverted to some other objective by a commander on the surface below...", It is also very doubtful if a commander on the surface, after the air battle is in full swing, would consider himself sufficiently well informed of the situation as to issue any order to units in the air." Also, "The time of the rendezvous must be definitely set and the time of take-off from ships and carriers must be so arranged that no one plane or flight will have to wait an excessive time for the others". In the form-up period on 4th June, this lesson was also not applied. "When two fleets engage in battle it is not logical to suppose that aircraft will be held in reserve...", and thus the use of part of the available American striking force for a short-range reconnaissance to the north on Day One of the battle, might well be considered such a misuse of their striking power, and Bellinger had emphasised that the fleets aircraft should, "...be used for their primary purpose, that of gaining command of the air and using that command to damage the enemy." Bellinger warned that the commander who launched his striking force "...too late, may give command to the enemy..."

Finally Bellinger emphasised again and again that:-

"As the air forces of two opposing fleets come within striking distance of one another, the question as to when, what and with what to strike will be of great concern to the air commander. The air force that first seriously damages the major source of supply or floating air bases, such as aircraft carriers, of his opponent, will gain a material advantage, and this advantage becomes the more vital the greater the percentage of aircraft there are on board at the time the carrier is damaged. It would therefore seem that the time to strike would be at the earliest moment that aircraft could reach the enemy's carriers [f/n 34] and successfully carry through their offensive."

On 4th June 1942, that same officer, now a Rear Admiral, was one of Nimitz's close advisers on air matters and it is inconceivable that Nimitz's plan did not include these basic tenets in their drawing up. Likewise, Captain Arthur "Art" Cayley Davis, another old aviator, talking to Nimitz on 26th May 1942, placed enormous stress on the need for "prompt action" and that the American carriers should attack, "...at the earliest possible moment..." [f/n 35] Nimitz undoubtedly understood this policy was essential at Midway, for, at the end of May he sent a Memo to Davis showing that CINCPAC himself, at least, had taken this on board. "Balsa's [f/n 36] air force must be employed to inflict prompt and early damage to Jap carrier flight decks if recurring attacks are to be stopped. Our objectives will be first- their flight decks rather than attempting to fight off the initial attacks on Balsa", and he also stressed that even Midway's aircraft, "...should go all out for the carriers", leaving the islands defence to the anti-aircraft artillery. So it is obvious and clear that, in June 1942, Nimitz was entirely focused on the earliest possible attacks on the Nagumo carriers by every available aircraft, as the absolute essential core of his Midway plan, no matter what academics might say in 2008. No short-range carrier aircraft searches away from the expected enemy approach, and no holding back aircraft in reserve formed part of Nimitz's thinking at this point whatever came later.

The aviators were in no doubt, and their theories had received ample confirmation by practical examples down the years to reinforce them. It had been proven over and over again in the 1930 Fleet Problems conducted by Lexington and Saratoga which involved carrier-versus-carrier exchanges, the one overriding lesson absorbed was, that the carrier force whose aircraft struck the enemy first, usually emerged the victor. The successful 'First Strike' ensured no 'Counterstrike'. This was codified into doctrine in March 1941, fifteen months prior to Midway, by revisions incorporated into it [f/n 37] These read, "The surest and quickest means of gaining control of the air is the destruction of enemy carriers", to which "...all other considerations are secondary..." In practical terms, the enemy carriers did not have to be destroyed in this first strike, only their flight-decks disabled, for once that was done they ceased to any kind of threat or have any value in battle and could not launch any counterstrike. But it had to be the entire enemy flight decks put out of commission, which, in turn, logically meant a full commitment of all available means to the attack, not a partial contribution. This was quite clearly stated [f/n 38]:- "...all enemy carriers must be put out of operation at the earliest practicable moment. The attack group should be of such strength and their fire so distributed that all enemy flight decks are damaged, at least to the extent that their aircraft cannot be operated therefrom (sic). [f/n 39] This may necessitate a departure from our previous idea of concentration "to sink" rather than "to disable" but during this initial phase of an action the results may well be disastrous if even one enemy carrier is left undamaged." [f/n 40].

Putting all those lessons into practice was Halsey's intent. He, after all, had signed the new version of the doctrine document. How was he to have accomplished it? Dusty Kleiss, a senior SBD pilot aboard Enterprise at the battle recorded [f/n 41] that:- " Dick Best (and possibly Earl Gallaher) listened intently to what Admiral Nimitz wanted us to do in our Ambush Attack. Nimitz recorded the expected dates, ships, courses and sequences he'd learned from his Code Group. He pointed out the most vulnerable spot for us to attack the enemy carriers, and even their most likely course while heading to Midway. Only SBD's were involved; our other planes lacked enough range for a surprise attack. Sending out our SBD's on searches to find enemy carriers would make any ambush impossible...searches by some other means was essential. Earl Gallaher talked with us section leaders about all he had learned, either from Nimitz or Dick Best. Had any combined attack been planned by Nimitz, we would have been given charts or diagrams or other schedules or groupings, just like Halsey had previously done. All that was lacking. I searched diligently for some reason for Fletcher to be away from his directed location at dawn on the 4th June, but found none." It was not a 'after-the-event' theoretical scenario that Kleiss was putting forward here, as some still choose to interpret it, but a statement of Halsey's determined intent. Halsey, therefore, would most certainly, have fought a very different Battle of Midway to that subsequently adopted by Fletcher, for good or ill! Proof positive that Dusty's memory of Halsey's revised thinking was totally correct, and not a distant afterthought as some imply, was given at the time of the battle, it being clearly stated in the Revised edition of the Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine Halsey issued, where it was stated quite clearly that this policy was "...a departure from our previous idea of concentration 'to sink' rather than 'to disable'". Now the idea was first to disable every enemy carrier flight deck and render them all inoperable. The torpedo attacks, which were still deemed more likely to sink ships if successful, could do their job later once the dive-bombers had done their job, because once the SBD's had disabled every flight deck, the torpedo bombers would face no opposition and could take their time sending the enemy ships to the bottom.

Vice Admiral William Halsey with his Aircraft Battle Force Staff

Above: Vice-Admiral William Halsey (centre) with his Aircraft Battle Force Staff (Miles Browning is on Halsey's immediate right-hand side with cigarette) (U.S. Navy)

Prior to Midway, Nimitz and his team certainly did allocate one pre-determined, fixed co-ordinated position, termed “Point Option’, which was Lat 32, Long 173, around which Fletcher was free to manoeuvre his Task Forces, in two separate groups, while awaiting confirmation of known intelligence and updates of the same. But this was not the same thing as having the carriers in place to launch that vital "First Strike" with the absolute minimum of delay. What Commander Charles J. Logan, USN, has termed, "The information superiority payoff at the operational level" [f/n 42], gave Nimitz, "...the time and space to allow his tactical commanders the best chance of success." How did they take advantage of that situation?

As indicated above, during the tense waiting period Nimitz, still in overall Tactical Command, ordered [actually ‘suggested’ but, it has been said, when the C-in-C 'suggests' a course of action, you comply!] certain movements, as on the 2nd June, which Fletcher conformed to. Nimitz's 'suggestion' of the 2nd, as I say in the book, influenced Fletcher's positioning on the 3rd, but the earlier conference decision still predominated. One critic has, incredibly, taken my defence of Fletcher and twisted it to become an attack on him! Is this due to some over-sensitivity on this persons part, as a self-appointed protector of Fletcher's memory, or is there some peculiar ulterior motive in suggesting an anti-Fletcher bias where there patently is none? I don't know but it all seems rather bizarre.

Reverting to what the situation was at dawn on 4th June, the C-in-C's 'suggestions' apart, the fact remained that the ultimate choice of what was to be the best place from which to subsequently start off and quickly attain the “Desired Position” when the time was deemed right, remained Fletcher’s and Fletcher’s alone. “If the Japanese, as expected, planned to hit Midway at dawn, perforce they would have to be well within 300 miles of the target.” [f/n 43]. Intercepted signals indicated the Japanese would launch as close in to Midway as fifty miles. [f/n 44]. The Office of Naval Intelligence [f/n 45] stated unambiguously: "...we knew of the enemy's presence, the approximate composition of his force, and because we had calculated correctly, his method of approach". However, despite these advantages, the same report had to conceded, "Our single misfortune was the failure to locate and attack the fourth enemy carrier with sufficient promptness..." adding, "That failure cost us the Yorktown." How sure were the American Intelligence team of Nagumo's predicted position? Layton's final report to Nimitz had the Japanese carriers attacking on a 315 degree bearing and forecast they would first be located 175 miles from Midway around 0600 and commence launching their air strikes south-west toward Midway at dawn. Admiral 'Mac' Showers, on the Hypo team at Pearl that day, asserted that, in his strong contention, Ady's PBY search plane from Midway was given the precise bearing down which to search for and locate the Nagumo force, so accurately was its position predicted. [f/n 46] As early as May 18th at least two decrypted messages from a Japanese First Air Fleet's Staff Officer had revealed to the Americans that the Nagumo force planned to attack from the north-west of Midway.

Even if this should prove not to be the case, far from having to search the, "vast expanses of the Pacific" for the enemy, as some recent hyperbole has it, the combination of the predicted enemy approach, their known target and the wind direction prevailing at the time with its dictatorial affect on carrier operations and headings, all left a very narrow band of probability indeed to be acted upon. To re-iterate once more, as Nimitz's biographer, E. B. Potter, (who was a Professor Emeritus of History at US Naval Academy, Annapolis and a veteran World War II naval Commander) recorded, the 27th May meeting had agreed that, in order to achieve this, "...at that same hour the American task forces, on course southwest through the night, should be 200 miles north of Midway, ready to launch on receiving the first report from U.S. search planes of the location, course, and speed of the enemy." [f/n 47]

The Potter account, even though he closely consulted with Nimitz himself, [f/n 48] and receiving direct written input from him personally, also used the CinCPac Command Summary, or Gray Book, as the basis for his work, has been scorned by the same critics that have attacked my book, as being a "secondary source" (unlike the critics own works of course one assumes), so perhaps they might consider what another "primary source" had to say on this. There could be no more primary source than Joseph J. Rochefort himself, so what did he state? During his Oral History interview with Kitchen [f/n 49], she asked him whether he had pinned down the dates the Japanese would strike, "And you did indicate June 3rd, 4th?" Rochefort replied;- "We did reproduce the table, the little cipher table of months and days and hours, and we did make our assumptions then that this had to be in June and that days 'A' would be commencing, say, June 3 or whenever it was in Alaska, which was a diversion attack, June 4th and so on and so forth. Also included in this were the time of take-off, the location of take-off and the direction of approach." Kitchen asked, "Of the planes?" Rochefort answered, "Of the planes. So, as an example, this May 25th despatch of ours, which was the final dispatch bearing directly on the operation -- the Japanese operation-- contained such things as where the Japanese aircraft carriers would be when they launched their planes, degrees and distance from Midway, and the hour and the minutes." [f/n 50]

Another Intelligence veteran Gilven Slonim recorded [f/n 51]: "We knew the forces coming, their commanders, their intentions and their arrival time." Slonim added that the Spruance, and so presumably therefore Fletcher also, was fully aware that, "...it was essential that he have the element of surprise and he hit first, and hit hardest, with everything he had." Aboard the Enterprise, Richard H. Best attended a briefing given by Spruance, and he recalled [f/n 52]- "The briefing was explicit concerning the identities of the carrier, the battleship and cruiser divisions. The detail was mind-boggling. To know the timing and the identity of the forces involved was stupefying..."

Analysts Builder, Bankes and Norden noted [f/n 53], "For the most part, Spruance and Fletcher faithfully executed Nimitz's operational plan. The only discretion they exercised under that plan was deciding precisely when to launch their air strikes and when to retire or advance from the flanking position."

Thus it was Fletcher who, finally, “steered TF-17 and TF-16 southwest at 13.5 knots to be two hundred miles north of Midway at dawn”; in readiness of receiving more precise information of his foe from Midway’s search aircraft. It has been recorded [f/n 54] that, "...Fletcher swung southwest intending to be 200 miles north Midway at dawn on 4 June, and again ready to fight according to plan..." [f/n 55] It would appear pretty clear that in doing so he was following Nimitz's 27th May conference orders, rather than by sheer coincidence selecting the same distance independently. So whose plan was being followed, Nimitz's or Fletchers?

Let us repeat, according to one critic, who also had access to the 'Gray Book' it was Fletcher's plan. However, according to Potter, who not also had access to that self-same 'Gray Book' , but, additionally, Admiral Nimitz's own personal input, it was Nimitz's. Regardless of it's origins- if the American carriers actually were in that desired position and configuration at dawn, then all well and good. As the ONI recorded, "During the night of June 3rd-4th our task forces moved south-southwest to a position about 200 miles north of Midway. It was hoped that they would be able to catch the enemy striking force on the flank when it launched its anticipated attack on the islands."

Examining the Deck Diary of the carrier Hornet on the 3rd/4th June, we can trace that 0880/3rd she was in Latitude 32 36N, Longitude 175 52 W; at noon the same day she was in 33 06N, 176 01W, and at 2000 that evening she was in 33 18N, 175 47W. While Hornet's Standard Magnetic Compass (No. 586) was showing a 34E Error, with a 11E Variation and a 23W Deviation, her Gyrocompass (No.586) was showing an 0.5E error. Between those hours her course was 110 (True and per gyrocompass) at 2000, and at 2150 the whole formation turned right to course 210 true [f/n 56] and this course remained steady at 210 (True and pgc) until 0640 when Hornet changed course by ships turn to 040 (True and pgc) [f/n 57]. Not until 0800/4th did Hornet's log record that she cut in all her boilers on the main steam line, and the whole formation (with the AA cruiser Atlanta acting as Fleet Guide) and turn left to the new course of 300 (True). Seven minutes later all the ships went to General Quarters and at 0811 the Task Force changed course to 270 (True) followed three minutes later to 240 (True) while successively working up to at first twenty and then twenty-four knots [f/n 58].

Thus, at 0600 on 4th June, when the first word came in of the sighting of the enemy carriers, TF-17 was not steering south-west at all, but steering almost due east, “committed”, to use one critics own words, to the retrieval of the morning air search [f/n 59] that he had ordered to be flown northward, while TF-16 was steering 040 degrees (north-north-east) to conform to Fletcher’s standing instructions to maintain a position south-west of TF-17. Far from being, "cocked and ready" Hornet recorded that at 0737 she had. "Let fires die out under boilers No.1, 4 and 7. Average steam 400. Average R.P.M. 145.7, at a speed of fifteen knots. So, Nagumo’s carriers were steering south-east toward Midway, and Fletcher’s carriers, far from steering south-west, were at that vital moment were steaming at a leisurely pace and steering either north-north-east, or east, which turned out to be away from the enemy and also, incidentally, away from Midway against where they knew the initial Japanese attack was probably going to be mounted.

Now to the point. I have never suggested, "implied" or had even for one moment considered, that this was, “a swerve to avoid the enemy” as my accuser states, but only ever a turn away which was the unavoidable result made necessary by Fletcher's earlier decisions, and for anyone to suggest otherwise is pure vindictive speculation on my accusers part. Their minds might think like that, but my mind never did!

Furthermore, in the same paragraph of my book that is cited, I go on to explain the reasons why, in some detail and with sympathy for Fletcher's decision. This is totally ignored by my critics, and one wonders why it was ignored. Is this selective quoting used simply because it appears to show a more biased viewpoint in my book than was actually the case? If not, then why was not the whole paragraph fully quoted, why only a part? It certainly appears as though only one slant has been picked out in order to make a point that does not exist, presumably in order to negate the whole book's neutral approach. Later in my book I deliberately pointed out that Commander Walsh's theory, "...found some backing from other naval officers who had studied the battle, [f/n 60] but that others who have studied the battle reach different conclusions to him on the original placing of American forces." Yet this even-handedness is deliberately ignored by my critics and their vocal backers, so eager do they seem to be to invent some kind of "conspiracy" on my part, where none ever existed! One critic even alleges a so-called 'Walsh-Smith condemnation' and a "Walsh-Smith thesis", and yet, although I quote with equal emphasis the point-of-view expressed in Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, there is no reference by him to what would be an equally fictional 'Lundstrom-Smith thesis" or a "Lundstrom-Smith condemnation". The plain fact is that every viewpoint is represented equally in Midway Dauntless Victory and there is no conspiracy in my book, unless it is the right for differing viewpoints to be heard!

Steering away from such apparent deliberate selectivity, let us examine the position without such bias. At this critical juncture in the battle did this configuration meet Fletcher’s own intended interpretation the best starting position so the carriers could quickly reach Nimitz’s desired “striking distance”, or, as former dive-bomber pilot George Walsh termed it, “Desired Position”? Probably not, due partly to the fuel oil situation of the screening destroyers, which resulted in a slower approach speed being adopted than Fletcher had originally been decreed. Commander Epps of the destroyer Aylwin screening Enterprise, stated that his vessel was in position Lat 31-40, Long 176-04 at this time, when they ought to have been in position Lat 31-35, Long 177-22. Hornet's deck log shows her in 31 39N, 176 13W at 0800. This misalignment from what had been at first been intended was compounded by the need for Yorktown to gather in her search aircraft, which dictated her eastward course, and earlier orders, which tied in Spruance’s force to Yorktown’s movements. Due to the fact that Fletcher had flown air searches to the north, for fear he might be outflanked by a second enemy force, (because only two enemy carriers had been mistakenly been reported rather than the actual four present), it was the recovery of these aircraft and the prevailing wind conditions that brought about the temporary “turn away” from Fletcher’s planned south-westerly progression, and I have never suggested otherwise.

Because of this consequence of Fletcher's earlier decision, Spruance, who later recalled that he had, "...wanted to hit the Japanese carriers as early as possible with all the air strength available...." [f/n 61] was instead forced to initiate the attack himself, with just two of the three US carriers air groups, rather than, "all the air strength available" as Yorktown was unable to immediately comply. The two carriers of Spruance’s Task Force, Enterprise and Hornet, could quickly be released to steer to close the gap with the enemy and then attack. They were not yet anywhere near the “Desired Position”, and certainly not within, “early striking range” of the enemy, by a long chalk, because, I repeat, the original sighting reports were in considerable error with regard to the "estimated distance" they wrongly transmitted, and the enemy were, in fact, well beyond range of all the American carrier aircraft. Moreover, Spruance still could not immediately reverse course to close the gap until Fletcher released him from his standing orders and that Fletcher did at 0607, but urged him not to attack until he had definite contact. But crucial time had been forfeited as well as distance.

So at 0607, on the credit side for the Americans, was the fact that, due partly to poor Japanese reconnaissance, the presence of the US carriers was thought to be unknown to the Japanese, while the Americans now knew (or thought they knew) the exact location of their enemy (or at least some of the enemy), who, they also knew, was probably committed against another target, Midway Island. Could they take full advantage of this superb situation? – Well, No, unfortunately not full advantage, because, to repeat the scenario, only two of the American carriers of the three present could actually immediately steer and close the range, one had to continue opening the range for a while due to the dictates of the wind on landing her own aircraft. As the ONI recorded- "Because it had planes in the air, and because only two enemy carriers had been reported, the Yorktown's planes were temporarily held in reserve." Black Shoe Carrier Admiral concurs- "The plain facts are that the Yorktown was out of effective range of Nagumo until after 0830....." [f/n 62] Agreed, and why was that? Also, being in the opening position that Fletcher's various reasoned decisions had actually, rather than hopefully, placed them in, had further adverse affects as well, even forty minutes later, as again as the ONI listed. "Despite steaming hard at 25 knots to close the range, by 0700 even the Enterprise and Hornet were at still extreme estimated range when they finally began to launch their strikes." Moreover:- "Unfortunately the wind was light from the southeast, so that our carriers had to turn away from the enemy for launching..." [f/n 63]

Back at Pearl Layton recorded that Nimitz and his staff were “confident”, that on receipt of the PBY report, both Fletcher and Spruance, “would be steaming hard to close the range”. However, for a while at least, and due to the dictates of the weather, Yorktown was not so closing the range, being still committed to steering yet further away from the now-known enemy until she had gathered in her aircraft. When she eventually did so and turned around to follow the other two carriers, she was some sixteen miles astern of them. To repeat, as Black Shoe Carrier Admiral recorded, "The plain facts are that the Yorktown was out of effective range of Nagumo until after 0830..."[f/n 64]

One can also speculate why, if it was considered necessary, this short-range (100 mile) air patrol northward could not have been more usefully mounted by the Curtiss SOC Seagull float-planes carried aboard the American heavy cruisers then in company with Yorktown, who could carry up to four apiece. Certainly their range (1,004 miles) was more than adequate to cover the sector actually searched by the SBD's, while those self-same SBD's could have been better employed by being armed and ready to conduct a concerted action with the rest of Yorktown's strike force, alongside those of Enterprise and Hornet against the Nagumo force. At least, not being carrier-borne types, any sighting of these questing amphibians by the Japanese, would not have confirmed that American aircraft-carriers were in the area, such as the sighting of SBD's would have most certainly done, so insurance-wise their deployment on this mission would have been a sounder option.

Dusty Kleiss had flown cruiser floatplanes earlier in his career and he commented: - “As usual, you are correct that cruiser sea planes should have continued to be used for searches, rather than SBD’s on the 4th of June. No Japanese were found in our area on 3rd June, and that area seems to have been extensively covered. [65]The Yorktown SBD’s should have been poised for instant takeoff at the dawn of the 4th June, fully loaded with bombs, at the designated location. I can think of absolutely no reason why Fletcher failed to put us at the designated place at dawn, ready for immediate takeoff and attack.”

Dusty added: - “I wonder what would have happened if one of those 10 SBD planes had found an enemy ship. Would he radio, breaking another of Nimitz’ rules? Fly directly home, showing our position? Could Fletcher ignore the definite carrier (or carriers) near the ‘found’ location? [Critics of Mitscher have accused him of doing just that on far less evidence]. Would he radio or use other means? Try a running rendezvous to attack a reported carrier, based solely by a new pilot? Ignore Nimitz plan completely? I can think of no reason why cruiser planes should have been used on any local searches that day.” [66]

Kaiser Wilhelm gave me this assessment of the eight Curtiss SOC’s embarked aboard Fletcher’s two heavy cruisers that morning. “We usually flew 5 hours, or less. All 4 of our SOC aircraft were always in full operational mode. The other heavy cruiser, Astoria, was the same as Portland. I did not fly on Thursday 4th June,” and he added the fact that, “…we pilots were told that we would not fly until early Friday 5 June. We resumed our air operations the following morning at 0600.”[67]

0600 Ralph Wilhelm offers this reason why the Seagull was not employed to make this dawn search northward because, he assumes “….they did not want cruiser aircraft being launched or recovered which would slow them down!” [68]

On the length of time that the SOC’s would take to recover after completing such a sortie, Kaiser had this to say: “I would estimate about 15 minutes per SOC. Only one SOC can be recovered at a time. The Captain and the OOD would head the ship about 25 degrees to starboard of the wind line, then hoist a flag indicating aircraft recovery operations in affect. The SOC to be recovered sees the flag so the pilot flies up the starboard side of the ship at 500ft altitude. When the SOC is at this point the ship to-blocks the flag and commences to turn the ship to port through the wind line to degrees to port of the wind line. The manoeuvre by the ship is supposed to cause a slick to form which the pilot is supposed to land in. The pilot then taxis the SOC up the port side of the ship for a port recovery, or up the starboard side of the ship for a starboard recovery. The one main crane, located amidships, then lowers to the SOC so it can be attached to the upper wing of the SOC. The Radioman then stands over the pilot and hooks the crane to the hook on the upper wing. The SOC is then put on one of the two catapults on either side of the ship’s welldeck. This entire recovery operation could take between 15 and 30 minutes!” [69]

Jacket1.

Lieutenant Ralph V. “Kaiser” Wilhelm, USN. (© Ralph Wilhelm, 2009).

Jacket2.

A Curtiss SOC Seagull being recovered by a US heavy cruiser after a reconnaissance flight. (N.H.C. Washington DC)

On that estimate using the eight SOC’s for the abortive north search on the morning of the 4th would have delayed Astoria and Portland by a little over an hour or maybe 90 minutes. Against that, having to turn Yorktown away from the known enemy position to  recover her SBD’s cost about the same amount of time to be made up, but would not have revealed the presence of an American carrier to any enemy eyes. In theory, the cruisers could have been left behind with a destroyer or two, to pick up their aircraft while Yorktown pressed on with most of the destroyers until she made the first launch in conjunction with the Spruance carriers to get in the heaviest strike at the earliest time.

To reiterate, whether or not one agrees that Fletcher’s decision to fly air searches to the north was a wise and prudent thing to have done, or whether one does not, it was a decision that brought unavoidable consequences in its train, dictated by the wind direction over the carriers deck for launching aircraft and recovering them. And one of those consequences was that at 0600 Fletcher’s Task Forces were not steering south-west at all, but, respectively, east and north-west. [f/n 70] How exactly did this scenario fit Admiral Nimitz original orders, as well as those embodied in his battle plan, and given emphasis by Art Davis advice that it was, “particularly important that the carriers be able to take action at the earliest possible moment” [f/n 71], a point which Nimitz constantly kept in front of his subordinates in later signals?

Surely, the real points of contention here are, could Fletcher, given the comparatively free rein allowed him by his C-in-C, (“Nimitz did not micro-manage”) have positioned his two separate forces to more advantage prior dawn on 4th? Fletcher, it is claimed, independently selected for his “convenient starting position” a point roughly 200 miles north of Midway from which to achieve Nimitz’s desired objective, the “successful and timely employment” [f/n 72] that the C-in-C expected in order to surprise the enemy, once sighted. Would a more-carrier orientated Commander have chosen a different course and speed, might he have exercised his options to edge closer to Midway’s north-eastern flank from where the enemy attack was expected to be launched? Or, in the light of Nimitz’s orders not to risk “his” carriers, and later “suggestions,” would such a person have done the exactly the same as Admiral Fletcher did? Furthermore, should Fletcher have flown off those early-morning air searches to the north, which had the unfortunate by-product of resulting in one-third of his strike force being further tied-down for a while at a critical time?

One can certainly understand why Fletcher would wish to check over his shoulder; uncertainty of the whereabouts of the two “missing” enemy carriers, coupled with his previous experience at the Coral Sea Battle, where he was “jumped” by the enemy, would naturally and quite reasonably wish him to prevent being surprised by the two unreported enemy carriers from the four that had been originally reported to be out. One can certainly sympathise with his dilemma, it was an achingly hard choice to make. On one hand there was the consideration that, if carrier-type American aircraft from Yorktown’s search actually had sighted such an enemy force so far north, (not only of TF16/17 but Midway Island’s air bases), then they, in turn, would have probably been sighted and identified in return, thus revealing to the Japanese the indisputable fact that US carriers were on the scene. Was risking that prime Ace-in-Hole surprise factor worth it in order to prevent TF16/17 being jumped by two unreported enemy carriers? Admiral Fletcher must have thought so, and that’s fair enough, but if it was indeed his decision, and nobody else’s, then, as I state on pages 55-56 of my book, he must therefore bear the responsibility for its subsequent knock-on effect upon his 0600/4th positioning.

Other questions remain. It has been stated that Admiral Nimitz actually advised Fletcher not to fly off any of his own searches until he had definite word Midway was under attack? Rear-Admiral Mac Showers, at the time of Midway working with Nimitz's Hypo Intelligence team, recalled in 2007 that -"Admiral Nimitz, knowing what he did about the Japanese plans and knowing the Japanese would not be aware of our actions/plans, directed that our forces remain undetected until after the first strike on Midway." [f/n 73] The highly-respected, veteran Intelligence officer, an Ensign at the time, later twice modified his original statement from that no searches were to be flown to no attacks were to be flown. OpPlan 29-42 certainly contained the instruction to the Striking Forces to, "Initially establish air search in the northeast sector from Midway to eastward of bearing twenty degrees true from that place", but the key word here is "Initially". The same language was used by Chief of Staff Draemel in Appendix 2 of the OpPlan. Under the heading "Initial Areas for Striking Forces, he specified- 1. Task Force SIXTEEN initially operate north of latitude 32 degrees and west of longitude 173 degrees W. 2. Task Force SEVENTEEN initially operate north of latitude 32 degrees and east of longitude 173 degrees W. 3. Both task forces during each local forenoon approach Point "Luck" (Lat. 32 degrees N, Long. 173 degrees W) and exchange communications by plane if desired." But a rider was added to these initial dispositions, "4. The above is not intended to restrict the operation of either force in any manner but to avoid having embarrassing or premature contact made with own forces." [f/n 74]

In the latter instance, had this been the case, then that would have left the status of the any American carrier-based search that might have stumbled upon the Kido Butai prior to the Japanese attack on Midway Island, highly debateable. Indeed some people argue that by mounting such a search Fletcher might possibly be considered to have come close to violating Nimitz's specific instruction to remain undetected. Others maintain that he was actually obeying Nimitz OpOrder to, "...initially establish air search in the northeast sector from Midway to eastward of bearing twenty degrees true from that place." [f/n 75] It is really down to how one interprets a somewhat ambiguous instruction. What is clear is that premature Japanese knowledge that the US Task Forces were close by may possibly have been closer than many have thought. Certainly one of Nagumo's scouting planes reported fifteen unknown aircraft heading toward the Kido Butai early on the 4th and intercepting fighters were scrambled. Lisle A. Rose claims [f/n 76] that these reported aircraft were, "probably some of the scouts Fletcher had launched from Yorktown..." In strict contrast, Task Force 16 deliberately refrained from taking such a risk, Richard Best recorded that:- "Unlike previous ventures to the west, we flew no scouting flights in order to avoid any chance of radio interceptions in the event of plane emergencies." [f/n 77]

Because the relatively short-range searches by Yorktown aircraft to the north, whether conforming to Nimitz's orders or not, were of little value, so, was flying them worth the risk? Historian Johan Lupander [f/n 78] wondered because, "...the short distance flown only gave protection against being surprised by fast and heavy surface forces, not against IJN carriers that could have posed a threat from much further away." Again, always remember that the Japanese aircraft outranged the Americans so had there been two carriers to the north they would have been more likely to have discovered Yorktown than vice-a-versa. Was this, perhaps, an example of Fletcher's "Black Shoe" thinking? Furthermore, the two available radar-equipped PBY's at Midway would have been far more usefully employed in a search for the Kido Butai along the predicted bearing (325 degrees), rather than for a pin-prick attack against the troop transports, no matter how gallant and bravely conducted, which contributed nothing to the battle. If these two radar-equipped PBY's had been used more wisely to seek out the main enemy, as Lupander poses, then- "Just imagine the value of a position report on the Kido Butai around midnight June 3rd/4th". [f/n 79] Such a radar-assisted sighting and cross-checking by the two Catalina's would have enabled the two American Task Forces to favourably position themselves far earlier and employ their full strength to far greater effectiveness. This was certainly not Fletcher's fault of course. However, Lupander also notes that Nimitz's directive that the fighter aircraft were to be used for strike escorts, not for base defence, was disregarded.

To summarise once more.

1: Whether it was Nimitz's order, suggestion or wish, or whether it was Fletcher's independent decision, the ideal position of being at the "200 miles" distance at dawn WAS NOT ACHIEVED. The "Black Shoe" concern of Fletcher for his destroyers' oil situation overrode the long-established "Brown Shoe" desire to be within striking range at the earliest possible moment. As Commander Epps subsequently noted this meant that the US carriers were 40 miles out from that position which translated in about 1-1/2 to 2 hours hard steaming for the carriers, and therefore that amount of time wasted before any launch could be made. This also affected the distance the American strike aircraft subsequently had to fly and restricted both their search and their safety. It has been argued that Fletcher did not want to get in the path of the initial Japanese strike on Midway, but from Intelligence reports it was assumed that this was to be launched at a range of 50 miles from that island, so being at 200 miles would not have made any difference. Anyway, it is also argued by the same critics that it was Fletcher's own decision to select the 200 miles position, [which he then failed actually to do], so such critics seem to both want their cake and eat it.

2: Whether it was the interpretation of Nimitz OpOrder or whether it was Fletcher's independent concern at not being "bounced" by two unknown Japanese carriers from the north, the flying of short-range air searches from Yorktown meant, due to the resulting constraints of wind on launch and recovery, that only 2/3rds of the total US air striking power were immediately available to start an attack sequence once the enemy was sighted and not the full strength that pre-war "Brown Shoe" thinking had deemed vital.

3: Holding back F4F fighters for defence of Yorktown meant less aerial protection for the ill-fated TBD's against defending Japanese interceptors and must have contributed something towards their heavy losses. This was again a preference of the "Black Shoe" thinking of saving the ship by defending fighters, as against the "Brown Shoe" school of thought that such defence would never be one hundred percent effective and the best protection was to put ALL the enemy flight decks out of action as soon as possible.

4: Holding back part of the Yorktown's SBD striking force, at the very last-minute was contrary to an already agreed attack plan which further diluted the all-out aerial attack favoured by the "Brown Shoe" school of thought. This decision resulted in yet a further dilution of the attacking forces strength and may possibly have resulted in the Hiryu escaping unscathed and able to mount two counter-attacks. It has to be asked that, even had two Japanese carriers actually appeared to the north, what good would one small SBD force, outranged and outnumbered, been against them. They were "insurance" but hardly a decisive force when split between two enemy carriers and their defending fighters, and would have been better spent ensuring that the initial attack on the known enemy was decisive.

Did the position and course that Fletcher’s two Task Forces found themselves in at 0600 that fateful morning, in the end, really matter, given the known result of the battle? Or did the loss of the Yorktown and Hammann stem partly from the lack of enough US aircraft being available, (due to the distance they had to fly, later departure or holding back of part of the Yorktown force) to take out the Hiryu’s flight-deck, as well as the other three, on the first strike and thus prevent any chance of a counter-attack by the Japanese, an outcome long deemed the naval aviators ideal scenario, although a extremely difficult to achieve? These are vexatious issues that can now only be calmly debated, and debated they are, but hardly calmly, remaining the subjects of still bitter disputes. In my book I tried to present both sides of these arguments, totally without prejudice and without being partisan. This even-handed approach is now under fire, for, apparently, if you are not totally for a particular argument, then you are automatically rated in the opposing camp of whatever faction is involved. Well, I am neither!

I can therefore ask awkward things without being intimidated. Take the question on the initial positioning, "Did it matter?" George Walsh, a former veteran dive-bomber pilot who flew many long-range missions in the Pacific War and so might be thought to know a little about such things, thought that it did matter, and I presented his views. He later told me- "Seems to me that everyone ignores the time element, which is why I keep emphasizing 'dawn'. All the land-based planes knew exactly where the Kido Butai was. If properly positioned at dawn our carrier planes would also have known and located them just as easily and attacked by 0700. Fletcher's waste of time was as important as the increased range. Ring was looking for the Japanese over two hours too late, after they had changed course to the northeast. Because of radio silence, Ring was not informed of the target's change of course. McClusky had the same problem as Ring in locating the Japanese and being low on fuel, the destroyer heading northeast gave him a clue that he followed, ignoring the low fuel."; Jimmy Thach, who both fought in the air fighting at Midway and later commanded carriers and Carrier Task Groups, thus being familiar with all aspects of sea-air fighting, was pretty unambiguous about how he felt about things were organised that day, holding those views both at the time and many years later. And I presented his views. Dusty Kleiss, who served at Midway with VS-6 aboard the Enterprise, wrote to me that: "At Midway...Scouting Six wasted much time and fuel because Fletcher was doing his own thing."[f/n 80] Dusty later presented a very detail critique of the way the opening moves of battle were handled, stating, "What went wrong in the Battle of Midway? Answer: Almost everything possible" He then laid out his viewpoint in considerable depth and his conclusions were:- "RADM Fletcher kept silent about his intentions, and at dawn on the 4th June, we did not know whether he'd planned a Combined Attack or followed Nimitz' plan. All we knew was that we about 90 miles east of Nimitz' planned position, and that an enemy scout had just flown above us. Since Nimitz' plan was being ignored, our flight decks were shuffled and reshuffled..." When the force was finally despatched much time had passed. "By that time the enemy vulnerability period had vanished, and the projected location of enemy had also vanished. We were truly in a 'No Right to Win' situation." This, Dusty concluded, despite the fact that- "Earl Gallaher had told us that 'surprise' was the key element of our ambush." Dusty also commented on those who claim that the Yorktown Air Group was superior to that of the Enterprise, "That is beyond all belief. They had far more new pilots and had less practice. They had less time to master the YEZB. They dropped bombs on the Ocean. Their maintenance/ordnance crews should have checked arming circuits, and so on." [f/n 81] Bryan Crisman was the Disbursing Officer aboard the carrier Yorktown (CV-5) during the battle, and has written his own account. Posing the question, why did Fletcher stationed his ships 260 miles away from the enemy thereby stretching the fuel capabilities of the pilots and jeopardizing their ability to make the attack and return to the ship, he said, "I'm concluding that Admiral Fletcher was 'thinking' like a battleship-admiral of protecting the ship (first) and NOT like an aviator, he would have some of their perspective and would have positioned the ships differently." [f/n 82] Was the attack a model of co-ordination? Well C. Wade McClusky, recalled that:- "No information was received to indicate how the Yorktown group was to participate." [f/n 83] No “Armchair Warriors” these five gentlemen and nor are they "all anonymous" either!

Admiral Thatch, who had fought with distinction at Midway, when interviewed years later, was adamant, stating that he was, "...I was appalled that the Yorktown was in one task group separated from the Enterprise and the Hornet...." He continued," I'm sure that the people who made the decisions to have two task groups, separate, expected that they would remain close enough for mutual support, but it didn't work out that way. When Buckmaster realized that he was farther away than he wanted to be, that's when he or Admiral Fletcher cut me down to six fighters. Neither Fletcher nor Spruance were naval aviators - they had not grown up in carrier-based squadrons or had command of an aircraft carrier, where all the experience and knowledge is absorbed which would quality one to command a carrier task force." When asked who made the decision that they should stay that far apart, Thach replied: "Rear Admiral Fletcher directed Rear Admiral Spruance, Task Force 16, to proceed toward the enemy and launch a strike, saying he would follow.... So Frank Jack Fletcher caused the initial separation. Did he realize he was violating one of the basic principles of warfare?" He added, "And I was very bitter about this and was for a long time. I think one of the basic principles of warfare was violated, not intentionally, I presume. Of course, I was only a Lieutenant Commander then, and I couldn't fuss at anybody very much, and I'd only about fifteen years' experience in studying warfare, plus four years at the Naval Academy, where they taught us the basic principles of warfare, and they made sense."[f/n 84]

In contrast to these serving officers at the battle my chief critic, (who, we are continually reminded, indeed has a Masters Degree) during an earlier discussion [f/n 85] of this same topic, and on that same web site, expressed the opinion that he did not think that, "the issue was that crucial" and that, "it's no big deal." [f/n 86] He also stated that Admiral Fletcher "...didn't know their exact direction of approach", despite the ONI, Layton and Rochefort's assertions to the contrary. I have presented his full views on this, and other aspects also, quite extensively. Professor Alvin Kernan (who also has a degree and, additionally, was himself present at the battle) recently wrote that, "Fletcher clearly made a bad mistake in sending out from the Yorktown an SBD search in the early morning of the 4th", adding that if, "...Nagumo had been behind schedule and spotted a carrier scout, he would have known that we were on his flank, delayed his Midway attack, and gotten to us first." Furthermore Kernan said, "...I find Fletcher's operations from beginning to end hard to understand...", adding, "Indeed his role in the battle ...is puzzlingly uncertain." [f/n 87]

Strangely, my critics only quote from my book when I present the viewpoints that argue that Fletcher might possibly have done it better; they selectively ignores the fact that I even-handedly cite opinions both pro- as well as anti- Fletcher. For example they ignore the fact that I point out [f/n 88] the dilemma faced by Fletcher, where I state that although in theory placing the carriers within 180 miles of their opponents flight-decks would certainly have given him a better chance to outflank the Japanese and land some heavy blows, that it was not that simple, and that hard actuality required a delicate balance between risking being sighted himself against being close enough to hit the enemy should the opportunity arise; they ignore the fact that I cite Commander Epps opinion in support of Fletcher [f/n 89] ; they ignore the fact that I “extensively quote” from Black Shoe Carrier Admiral in support of Fletcher [f/n 90], they ignore the fact that, in fairness to Fletcher, I point that Fletcher’s bad reputation with many Marine Corps veterans might well indeed have been unjust, but that similar things have happened to others, Admirals Dudley North and Charles Forbes of the Royal Navy being two such examples. [f/n 91] More strangely still, they somehow turn my pointing out that it was partly due to Nimitz's order ("suggestions") of the 2nd that Fletcher found himself where he was on the 3rd and 4th, into a totally false allegation that I accused Fletcher of disobeying a non-existent order!

One wonders why this selective approach? Why only hold up negatives, why omit anything said favourable about Fletcher in my assessment? Why the one-sidedness? What is the motivation behind the “Cherry Picking” of quotes in this manner? Surely it cannot possibly be to suggest bias where there is none? In Midway Dauntless Victory I quite deliberately refrained from quoting from certain adverse reviews from anonymous sources, as my book, (incredible as it might seem to some) is not solely concerned about one particular book or writer, but about the whole battle and how it has been viewed down the decades by many historians, some once deeply honoured and respected but now currently being discredited and attacked. Like it or not, believe it or not, there really are people who disagree with some of my critics views on this matter, and, in my opinion, such viewpoints have as much right to be heard as theirs does and in my book they get that chance. Given both sides, each reader will decide for himself or herself which theory might be right or might be wrong, but I do not believe you can truly judge by giving only one side of an argument, so I give both. If that is nowadays considered unacceptable in some circles, then heaven help us all.

Am I wrong is finding something rather disturbing about all this? Not just from my chief critics on the Fletcher situation but also from others, who might have been expected to adopt as equally a neutral stance to myself as I have the whole battle? Selective quoting; ascribing views to somebody (myself in this instance) that have never ever existed, either on paper nor in my head; the instant discrediting of any viewpoint that dares to run contrary to certain adopted stance or standpoint; being questioned for even seeming to suggest that such viewpoints are there, let alone are subscribed to by anyone - other than those with the direst of agendas of course. I was once warned that this type of approach was being adopted in some quarters, and I dismissed it then as pure fantasy, a flight of fancy and gross over-reaction. Having now been on the receiving end, I am not so sure any more. What it comes down to is this, are we all to be banned from asking questions on this subject, or presenting alternative viewpoints, the matter now being considered totally resolved by a select clique on one Internet site [f/n 92] - or can differing viewpoints still be aired for discussion by neutral and open-minded historians actively seeking the full story and the complete truth?

I get my answer from the likes of veterans like Rex McCoy, a former Lieutenant-Commander and Gunnery Officer of a destroyer that exchanged salvoes with North Vietnamese shore batteries, who wrote to me, "I appreciate that you treat all of the participants with respect. As examples, the warriors of both sides are hailed for their courage and dedication to duty. But even more specifically, you note that the memories of the participants are to be respected, even if you think that they are wrong. You did not refer to those who may have 'mis-remembered' with disdain, but allowed the evidence to fall where it may, and let the reader make up his own mind. Some who have invested emotional capital in one version of the story or another may find that disturbing, but I find it refreshing" [f/n 93]

Heartened by such commendations from people who have served at the sharp end of naval warfare, I therefore continue my impartial search for all the facts with a new determination. The book is far from closed as far as I am concerned - so, watch this space!

Source Notes:-

1- Last updated January 2009

2- Serial 0114W

3- Point 10.

4- My emphasis.

5- My emphasis.

6- CINCPAC Message File, RG38, T.O.O. 032301W June 1942.

7- Milo Frederick Draemel (1884-1971) b. 31 May 1884, Fremont, Nebraska. Degrees from Villanova, Temple U., University of Pa. US Naval Academy Annapolis 1903-1906. 1906 Ensign. 1908 Commissioned. 1911, married Marguerite Clise, son and daughter. 1918 Flag Lieutenant, Commander Battleship Force. 1918 OIC Code and Signals Section, Navy Department, Washington, DC. 1921-June 1922 commanded destroyers. 1922-23 commanded destroyer Selfridge (DD-320). 1924-1926 Naval War College, RI. 1931-1932 - Commanded Submarine Tender Holland (AS-3). 1933-36 - Instructor, Naval War College, RI. 1937-39 -Commandant, Midshipmen, US Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD. December 1939, Rear Admiral. 1940-1941, Commandant Destroyers, Battle Force aboard light cruiser Detroit (CL-8). December 1941- June 1942 - COS to Commander, Pacific Fleet. 1942 - Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet then Commandant 4th Naval District. August 1946- retired. Distinguished Service Medal and Legion of Merit, Vice-President, Temple University, Philadelphia; Secretary Department of Forests and Waters, Commonwealth of Pa. Retired to Wynnewood, Pa. d. 25 March 1971. Buried Mount Pleasant Cemetery, Seattle, Wa.

8- Lynde Dupuy McCormick (1895-1956) b. Annapolis, MD. 12 August 1895. St. John's Preparatory School and College, Annapolis. 1911 US Naval Academy, graduating second in June 1915. Commissioned as Ensign. Joined battleship Wyoming (BB-32) Atlantic Fleet. 1917 joined Grand Fleet, Scapa Flow as 6th Battle Squadron, surrender of German High Seas Fleet November 1918. April 1919, Aide and Flag Lieutenant, Commander, BatDiv4, June - September aboard battleship South Carolina (BB-26). September - December, Aide and Flag Lieutenant Commander, Desron 4, Pacific, aboard protected cruiser Birmingham (CS-2). 1920- married Lillian Addison Sprigg, 2 October 1920, three children, December 1920, joined destroyer Buchanan (DD-131). August 1921 commanded destroyer Kennedy (DD-306). October 1921 Instructor, Department of Navigation, USNA. June 1923 Submarine School, New London, Con. 1924 appointed to submarines, Pacific, then successively to submarine S-31, submarine tender Canopus (AS-9), and from August to June 1926, in command of submarine R-10 at Honolulu, Hawaii. 1926-1928 Naval Academy, Annapolis, XD. August 1928-1931, commanded submarine V-2. May 1931-June 1934, Aide to Superintendent Naval Academy. 1934-1936- Navigator of light cruiser Marblehead (CL-12). April 1936-May 1937, commanded Fleet Oiler Neches (AO-5). June 1937 - May 1938 - Senior Course, Naval War College, RI, then staff. June 1939, Ops Officer, Commander Battleships, Battle Force, aboard battleship West Virginia (BB-48), then California (BB-44). February 1941 War Plans Staff, Pearl Harbor, then Nimitz's COS from April 1942. Rear Admiral 15 July 1942. Legion of Merit, February 1943, commanded the battleship South Dakota (BB-57) in North Atlantic and British Home Fleet. October 1943-March 1945, Staff of Admiral King as Assistant CNO, Logistics Plans and Joint Logistics Committee of JCS at Second Quebec and Yalta Conferences. Gold Star and second Legion of Merit. March-May 1945, Commander, BatDiv3 at Okinawa and occupation of Japan. November 1945 COS, Pacific Fleet and Deputy CinC. Vice-Admiral 13 February 1946. February 1947-November 1948, CinC Battleships-Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet. January 1948 Naval Mission to Argentina aboard heavy cruiser Albany (CA-123). 8 December 1948 Commander 12th Naval District, San Francisco as Rear Admiral. 22 December 1950, Vice-Admiral, Vice Chief Naval Operations. 20 December 1950, Admiral. 15 August 1951, CinC, Atlantic Fleet. January 1952, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, 1954. President, Naval War College, Newport, RI. Legion of Merit. d. 16 August 1956, interred US Naval Academy, Annapolis.Md.

9- William Houck Buracker (1897-1977) b. 25 July 1897, Lauray, Va. Attended local public schools, U S Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md, 1916. Midshipman aboard the battleships Texas (BB-35) and New Hampshire (BB-25). 1920, on graduation appointed to battleship Mississippi (BB-41). 1920 to destroyer Woolsey (DD-77) with Pacific Fleet. 1922 - Flight Training, NAS Pensacola, Fla., Naval Aviator 21 December 1922. 1923-1928 Scouting Squadron 1, Pearl Harbor. 1928 - Postgraduate course, Annapolis, Md, Aeronautical Engineering. MIT and Master of Science degrees. 1930-1932 Patrol Squadron duties, followed by Plans Division, BuAer, Washington, DC. 1933 Non-stop formation fight Hampton Roads, Va to Panama Canal Zone. 1934 Observation Squadron duties aboard battleship West Virginia (BB-48). 1936, Commander Torpedo Squadron 2B aboard carrier Saratoga (CV-3). 1937- Naval War College, Newport, RI. Seconded to USAAC Tactical School, Maxwell Field, Alabama. Navigator carrier Enterprise (CV-6). 1940-41- Staff, Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, Pearl Harbor. With Enterprise at Marcus, Marshalls and Gilbert raids 1942, awarded Silver Star. Staff duties 1942-1944. February 1944, commanded light carrier Princeton (CVL-23). Awarded Navy Cross and Purple Heart when Princeton was sunk in Philippine Sea 24th October 1944. 1946- Senior Navy Air Instructor, Army-Navy Staff College, Washington, DC. 1947 retired as Rear Admiral to Winchester, Mass. Legion of Merit. Wife Dorothy M. Martin and two daughters. d. 6 March 1977.

10- Walter Gabriel "Butch" Schindler (1897-1991) b. New Glarus, Wisconsin, 10 December 1987. Educated St. John's Military Academy and University of Wisconsin. US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md. 1917-21. Graduated 381st. Midshipman aboard battleship Missouri (BB-11), Atlantic Fleet. Ensign 3 June 1921. Served aboard battleship Tennessee (BB-43) then from June 1924 destroyer Robert H. Smith (DD-324). Lieutenant (j.g.) 3 June 1924. Postgraduate School, Annapolis, Md. in Ordnance Engineering to May 1930. Lieutenant 3 June 1927. Served again in battleship Tennessee to March 1933. Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department, Washington DC to 1935. Destroyer Squadron 5, Asiatic Fleet aboard destroyer Whipple (DD-217) then in command minesweeper Finch (AM-9) 1 July 1936. Lieutenant-Commander 3 June 1937, Gunnery Officer heavy cruiser Augusta (CA-31) Flagship CinC, Asiatic Fleet with additional command of Mine Division 3. April 1938-May 1940, Fire Control Section, Bureau of Ordnance, Washington DC. July 1940, appointed Gunnery Officer, Staff, Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force and Gunnery Observer and Training Officer from July 1941. Commander 1 July 1941. Navy Cross and Letter of Commendation Ribbon for extraordinary heroism and courageous devotion to duty with Task Force 17 at both Coral Sea and Midway battles. Flying as a volunteer rear gunner was credited with shooting down a Japanese A6M Zero fighter. Captain 20 June 1942. July to November 1942, Gunner Observer, Staff, Commander Cruisers, Pacific Fleet, then Task Force 11 to May 1943. Silver Star for Salamaua, Lae, Guadalcanal and Solomon Islands actions. November 1943 12th Naval District, San Francisco, Cal, then OIC Naval Ordnance Laboratory, Washington DC. Legion of Merit. Oversaw White Oak R&D Plant. December 1943 to June 1946, commanded the light cruiser Topeka (CL-67), Pacific area. August 1946 -June 1947 National War College, Washington, DC. June- December 1947, Office CNO, Washington DC. 1947-November 1949, Member then Chief, Naval Mission to Chile at Valparaiso. Rear Admiral 1 July 1948, effective 2 December. December 1949 Assistant Chief, BuOrd, Research. 25 July 1950, Command, Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Md. 14 July 1952, Commander CruDiv3, Korean War operations. TF77, Heavy Support July-November 1952 and April- July 1953. Gold Star. May-June 1953, Commander TG 95.2. September 1953 Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. 12 October 1955, Commander, Naval Forces, Germany. August 1957 Commander 8th Naval District, New Orleans, Louisiana. Vice-Admiral upon retirement 1959. Died Sarasota, Florida, 3 April 1991.

11- E. B. Potter, Nimitz, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md, 1976.

12- My emphasis.

13- Ralph Vincent "Kaiser" Wilhelm (1917-). b. Honolulu, Hawaii 1 October 1917, son of OIC Radio Station Koko Head, Oahu. Bachelor Degree from Loyola University, Los Angeles, 11 June 1939. 15 June 1939 seaman at Naval Reserve Aviation Base, Long Beach, flew solo on a N3N trainer. Transferred to NAS Pensacola, Fla. at Naval Aviation Cadet. Flight training at NAS Pensacola, Fla. 8 June 1940 graduated as pilot, commissioned Ensign, A-V (N), USNR. Assigned flying duties as a AV-N with Curtiss Scout Observation Catapult (SOC) Seagull catapult floatplanes aboard the heavy cruiser Portland (CA-33) ) 1942 Combat at Battles of Coral Sea, Midway and Savo Island 1942 when Portland sunk. XO of VS-65 and then VS-57 working from New Caledonia and New Hebrides. 7 Battle Stars, 2 Air Medals and a NUC. NAS Corpus Christi, TX.  January 1943 XO of Scouting Squadrons VS-65 and later VS-57 in South Pacific.  May 1944 commissioned in regular Navy at NATC, Corpus Christi. From 10 May 1944 CO of Training Squadron VN12D8-A, Cuddihy and later VN15-B, Kingsville.1945 transferred to USN. Air Officer of escort carrier Nehenta Bay (CVE-74). 1946- General Line School, War College, Newport, RI. 1947-49 - Navy Language School then Aviation Communications Officer, Joint Brazil US Military Commission, Rio de Janeiro. June 1949 Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, MA Industrial Relations and Personnel. June 1950 Aide and Flag Secretary, Commander Naval Forces Far East, Tokyo. NAS Atsugi, co-piloting VP-6 PwV-3W Neptune patrol aircraft, Korean War. June 1951 Panmunjom negotiations. 1951-54 - XO NAF, LitchField Park, Phoenix, AZ. 1954-55 CO VU-1 NAS Barbers Point, Oahu. 1955-NAS North Island, San Diego. 1957 XO and Associate Professor Naval Science at NROTC, Harvard University. 31 December 1959 voluntary retirement after 21 years service. 1 January 1960-82 Director Human Relations and Personnel, Honeywell Corporation, Boston and Phoenix. Married twice, Kay (m. 1941, d. 1988), twin son and daughter, Ralph Vincent, Jr. and Kristina Mary. Second wife Olga, m. 1991. Current residence is Poway, California.

14- Daily Log of Ralph "Kaiser" Wilhelm, Naval Aviator #6470, USNR; Entry for Wednesday, 3 June - titled - Our First Anniversary - 5th Day at Sea. Reproduced with his permission.

15- Commander Etta-Belle Kitchen, Oral Interview with Joseph J. Rochefort, USNI Annapolis, 1969- copy Naval War College, Newport, RI.

16- Admiral Edwin T. Layton, And I was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway- Breaking the Secrets, William Morrow & Co, New York, NY, 1986.

17- John Lundstrom, The First Team, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1990, pp 329.

18- My emphasis. Lieutenant-Commander David G. Schappert, USN, BS, Willpower: A Historical Study of an Influential Leadership Attribute, Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2003.

19- CINCPSAC 300227Z, CIMCPAC Bulletin Number 76 to all Task Force Commanders, 300241Z CINCPAC Message.

20- CINCPAC Message File RG38, NA.

21- CINCPAC OpPlan 23-42, dated 29th April 1942.

22- I used both latter terms (Midway Dauntless Victory, pp 55) solely to avoid constant repetition in my narrative but substitute Nimitz's words for both if it makes them less easy to accidentally, or deliberately, misunderstand.

23- My emphasis.

24- U.S. Officer of the Chief of Naval Operations, Battle Experience from Pearl Harbor to Midway, Information Bulletin No. 1, Washington DC: 15th February 1943.

25- John Henry Towers (1895-1955). Pioneer and tireless fighter for Naval Aviation, known as "Handsome Jack" in the Service. b. Rome, Georgia, 30 January 1895. US Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md. graduating in 1906. 1907-1908 Great White Fleet voyage. 1908 Commissioned Ensign, serving aboard battleship Kentucky (BB-6). 1909-10 battleship Michigan (BB-27). 1911, Hammondsport, NY for Aviation duties. Under Glen Curtiss, flying the Curtiss A-1, qualifying as Aviator August 1911. 1911- Supervisor, US Navy Aviation, Annapolis, Md. then Curtiss Flying School, North Island, San Diego, Ca. testing aircraft for the Navy. 1912 closely escaped death in plane crash into Chesapeake Bay. 5 March 1913, designated Naval Aviator No.3. January 1941, XO Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Fla. 1913, at Vera Cruz during Tampico Operation, OIC Aviation Unit aboard battleship Mississippi (BB-11) and armoured cruiser Birmingham (CS-2). August 1914-1916, Assistant Naval Attaché, London. 1916-1918 Naval Flying Corps, then Assistant Director Naval Aviation, Navy Department, Washington DC. May 1919 Transatlantic crossing by formation of NC seaplanes, commanding NC-4, from Newfoundland to Punta Delgada, Portugal. Navy Cross. 19101922, Lieutenant Commander XO of Flying Boat Tender Aroostook (CM-3), then commanded the aircraft tender, former destroyer, Mugford (DD-105). 1922-1923 XO NAS Pensacola. March 1923 - September 1925, Assistant Naval Attaché, London, Paris, Rome, The Hague and Berlin. 1925, BuAer, Shenandoah Court of Enquiry and Billy Mitchell allegations. January 1937 to August 1928, commanded carrier Langley (CV-1). 1928-1931, BuAer as Head of Plans Division, then Assistant Bureau Chief, Washington, DC. June 1931- Staff Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force. Helped planned the mock attack on Pearl Harbor, Navy Exercise No.4. June 1933-1934, Naval War College, Newport, RI, Senior Course. 1934-1939- OIC NAS San Diego, Ca, the Staff ComAirBatFor , commanded carrier Saratoga (CV-3), then Assistant Chief, BuAer Aircraft Procurement, expansion and pilot-training programmes. 1 June 1939, Chief, BuAer as Rear Admiral. 1939-1942, 6 October 1942, Vice Admiral Commander, Air Force, Pacific Fleet. Legion of Merit and DSM. 1944-45 Deputy CinC, Pacific Ocean Area and Deputy CinC, Pacific Fleet. 1945 Commander Task Force 38 aboard carrier Shangri-La (CV-38). A US representative at Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay aboard the battleship Missouri (BB-63). August 1945, commanded 2nd Carrier Task Force and Task Force 38, Pacific Fleet. 7 November, Commander 5th Fleet embarked in battleship New Jersey (BB-62). 1st February 1946, CinC Pacific Fleet aboard carrier Bennington (CV-20). Navy General Board Chairman, March -December 1947. Chief, BuAer, Washington DC. 1st December 1947, retired as four-star Admiral with 45 years service. 1948-53 Vice-President of Pan American World Airways. 1953-1956 President, Flight Safety Foundation, New York, NY. Died St. Albans Hospital, Jamaica, New York, 30 April 1955. Interred Arlington National Cemetery. Posthumously awarded Gray Eagle Award, Most Senior Naval Aviator 1928-1947. Known as the "Crown Prince of Naval Aviation". Married twice, Elizabeth Carstairs (Lily), divorced 1923, and Marie, Louise Anne Pierrette Chauvin de Grandmont (Pierre), one son and one daughter. International Hall of Fame, United States Aviation Hall of Fame and Naval Aviation Hall of Fame. The Guided Missile Destroyer Towers (DDG-9) was name in his honour. Biography, Clark G Reynolds, Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md, 1991. John H. Towers papers are in the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

26- Mrs Pierrette Anne Towers to Clark G Reynolds, 1985, cited in John H Towers: The Struggle for Navy Air Supremacy, op cit.

27- Comcrupac (Fletcher) to Cincpac (Nimitz), dated 24 September 1942, Naval Historical Center, Washington DC.

28- Gouin, Vice-Admiral Marcel Emil Alcan, Jr (1900-1960). b. 20th June 1900, Siasconset, Nantucket, Mass. Son of Marcel ("Markie") Gouin, carpenter and Livery Stable owner and Judith P. (nee Snow). One sister, Gwendolyn Lowell, b.1907. Attended Nantucket public schools and then Tabor Academy, finally Preparatory School, Annapolis. US Naval Academy Annapolis, Md, Graduated as Ensign 1924. Flight training and later Flight Instructor. 1 November 1940, Lieutenant-Commander VB-6, Enterprise (CV-6) CarDiv2. October 1941 - VB-6 aboard Enterprise (CV-6) Pacific. June 1942 Commander, Air Officer aboard Hornet (CV-8) replacing Soucek after Midway. 1942- fought at Battle of Santa Cruz and survived Hornet's sinking. Test pilot at NAS Patuxent River Flight Test Facility, Md. June 1944 Captain, C.O. escort carrier Admiralty Islands (CVE-99) with Plane Transport Unit of 5th Fleet in Task Force 50.8.4. at battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa 1944-45. 1946 Magic Carpet repatriations. 1947-48 commanding officer of VCN-2 Night Composite Squadron, Key West NAS. August 1949-July 1950 Captain of carrier Midway (CVB-41). 1952 Promoted Rear-Admiral. 1954 retired from Navy as Vice-Admiral. Died 16 May 1960. Buried in Lot 838 Prospect Hill Cemetery, Nantucket, Mass. Gouin Village, Nantucket is named in his honour and there is a dedication plaque to him at Nantucket Memorial Airport. A set of six of his Flight Log Books 1928-1938 and two Admirals Flags are held in Collection MS98 by Nantucket Historical Association. Portraits P15562, P13565 and P9176 NHA collection.

29 - Lea, Tom, article- Aboard the Hornet, in Life Magazine, 22nd March, 1943, pp 53.

30- John H Towers, Thesis, Influence of Aircraft on Naval Strategy and Tactics, Naval War College, 1934, pp 18.

31- Aviation, Confidential Lecture, 1 August 1924, Naval War College, Newport RI, 8 August 1924.

32- My emphasis.

33- My emphasis.

34- My emphasis.

35- My emphasis. NAS Midway Unit History, Appendix D2.

36- The US code name for Midway Island.

37- Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U. S Fleet Aircraft (USF 74).

38- Section 2-111(a) of USF-74 (Revised).

39- Emphasis in original document.

40- My emphasis.

41- Norman Jack Kleiss, Sr., Concerning U.S. Carrier Location on 4 June 1942 and Group Grope, e-mail to Peter C Smith (and others), Thursday, August 28, 2008, 9:10 PM. and reproduced with his permission.

42- Complexity at the Battle of Midway, Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, Naval War College, RI, May 2001.

43- Vide - John B Lundstrom, The First Team, U S Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1984, pp 329.

44- In fact, they actually launched at 150 miles range from Midway, but whether this was a change of plan by the Japanese, or, more likely, a faulty deciphering by US Intelligence, 50 instead of 150, remains unclear. But neither Ring nor McClusky was aware of this and a 50-mile from Midway launch for the Japanese, plus recovery, was all they ever had to go on.

45- Office of Naval Intelligence, Combat Narrative, Operations, The Battle of Midway June 3-6, 1942, Confidential, Publication Section, Combat Intelligence Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy, March 13, 1943, Washington DC.

46- e-mail, Showers to Ron Russell, copy to George Walsh, Sunday, August 26, 2007 6:30 AM.

47- E. B. Potter, Nimitz, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md, 1976.

48- Copies of correspondence in Papers of E. B. Potter 1959-1968, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC.

49- Commander Etta-Belle Kitchen, Oral Interview with Joseph J. Rochefort, USNI Annapolis, Md, 1969 - copy Naval War College, Newport, RI.

50- Ibid.

51- Gilven M. Slonim, "A Flagship View of Command Decisions", U S Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1958.

52- Thomas Buell, Oral Interview with Richard H. Best, USNI Annapolis, 15 May 1966 - Copy Naval War College, Newport, RI.

53- Master of the Game: Nimitz at Midway - Command Concepts, Rand, pp 37.

54- John B. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md, 2006.

55- My emphasis.

56- As logged by Lieutenant (j.g.) A. H. Hunker, USN.

57- As logged by Lieutenant (j.g.) R. J. Koshliek, USN.

58- As logged by Lieutenant (j.g.) A. H. Hunker, USN.

59- Hornet logged the wind at 0600/4th as Force 3 from a SSE direction.

60- Captain Grant C. Young, USN (Rtd) among them.

61- My emphasis.

62- John B. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, op cit,

63- Office of Naval Intelligence, Combat Narrative, Operations, The Battle of Midway June 3-6, 1942, op cit.

64- John B. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, op cit, pp 249.

65- Enterprise War Information Bulletin No. 122, 3 June 1942.

66 – Dusty Kleiss e-mail to the Author dated 23 March 2009 20:43.

67 – Kaiser Wilhelm e-mail to the Author dated 23 March 2009.

68- Kaiser Wilhelm e-mail to the Author dated 24 March 2009 9:19 PM

69 – Kaiser Wilhelm e-mail to the Author dated 25 March 2009 18:11

70- The Map of page 243 of Black Shoe Carrier Admiral illustrates this very well.

71- My emphasis.

72- CINCPAC 030325Z

73- Admiral Donald M. Showers, UDN (Rtd), Destination Point Luck, Navy TV DVD, 2007.

74- My emphasis.

75- CINCPAC OpPlan 23-42, dated 29th April 1942.

76- Lisle A. Rose, The Ship that Held the Line: The USS Hornet and the First Year of the Pacific War, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md, January 1996.

77- Buell, Oral Interview, op cit.

78- Johan Lupander, Midway 1942: Vandpunkten I Stilla havet, Norstedts, Sweden, 2007.

79- Ibid.

80- Norman Jack Kleiss, Sr., Concerning U.S. Carrier Location of 4 June 1942 and Group Grope, e-mail to Peter C. Smith (and others) Thursday, August 28, 2008, 9:10 PM.

81- Ibid.

82- e-mail, Saturday, February 17, 2008 12:23 PM, Bryan Clisman to Commander Walsh, by permission of George Walsh.

83- Rear Admiral Clarence Wade McClusky, "Historical Commentary", in Midway Battle Manual, Avalon Hill, Baltimore, Md, 1964.

84- Admiral Thach, Oral Interview, Thach #3 - pps 234 -236 & 273-276, op cit, repeated in Thach, Admiral John S., Reminiscences of Admiral John Smith Thach, U. S. Navy (Retired). U. S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1997, pps 62-65.

85- John Lundstrom, BOMRT, 30th August 2006.

86- Ibid.

87- e-mail, August 21, 2008 11:14, Professor Alvin Kernan to Commander Walsh, by permission of George Walsh.

88- Midway Dauntless Victory, op cit, pp 51

89- Ibid, pp 52.

90- Ibid, pp 292.

91- Ibid, pp 293.

92- Ronald W Russell, Closing the Book: Admiral Fletcher at Midway, BOMRT, 2nd October 2008.

93- e-mail, Thursday, November 13, 2008 7:27 PM, Rex McCoy to the Author.

(c) World Rights Reserved, Peter C. Smith, 2009

_____________________________________________________________

   

Jacket2

Flight to Nowhere or Flight of Fantasy?

Thoughts on Ring’s course from Hornet on the morning of 4th June 1942.

Commander Stanhope Ring, the leader of the Hornet’s first strike force on the morning of 4th June 1942, has been much criticised for adopting a course for that force that the leader of his Torpedo Bomber Group disagreed with, and which failed to find the Japanese Carrier Task Force.

There are numerous theories and speculated scenarios as to what course Ring led his aircraft on and much debate in books written to prove such-and-such a viewpoint. A whole mythos has grown up involving, inevitably it would seem in this day-and-age, a conspiracy theory that an elaborate “fix” was subsequently conjured up by everyone in the Mitscher circle from the pending-Admiral himself downward, in order to cover up a mistake on the initial attack routing. Just how every officer in the Hornet and her accompanying warships was made privy to, and willingly embraced, this mass deception (except perhaps Hornet’s radar officer and a few aviators who take a different line) without being found out is not made clear, but then again, conspiracy theories tend to feed on themselves.

At College Park I examined the large map prepared in the immediate aftermath of the battle, which forms the basis of this "conspiracy" theory because it is incomplete in some details. [f/n 94]. But this early composite map was not the last or the final map prepared by the US Navy of this battle, merely the one that everyone so far seems to assume it was and have made their claims accordingly. Maybe they should have looked a little harder before rushing to pronounce judgement.

Bombing Squadron Eight’s Action Report [f/n 95] stated that they launched, “… nineteen airplanes in company with Scouting Eight and ten airplanes of Fighting Eight to attack a Japanese force of carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers reported in Lat. 30-35 (N) Long. 178-35 (W).” Note the word used was "attack", not search, and the force to be attacked was specified. Their report did not say, or in any way use, the words search for a possible extra pair of carriers, position unknown! The report of VB-8 continued by stating that- “No contact was made in the vicinity of the reported position and the group turned south towards Midway to locate the enemy.” [f/n 96] That seems clear enough- they were looking for the Nagumo Force in the position that had been reported, not some nebulous, possible further enemy carriers.

Mitscher’s actual report read [f/n 97]: -

“None of Scouting 8 or Bombing 8 made contact with the enemy on the above flight. After searching the prescribed bearing the Squadrons turned south to search in the direction of enemy advance. As it turned out, had they turned north, contact would probably have been made. This was due to the fact that when planes took off, they took course to intercept the enemy, at that time reported headed on course 140° T., speed 25 knots. About one hour after the planes had departed the enemy reversed his course and started his retirement. We did not break radio silence to report this to the planes.”

Ring himself wrote an account three years after the event, which did not come to light until many years later. Although he did not include in that account an exact course, he did give a very precise description of where he ended up at the end of his outward leg, which was that he ended up where he had considered the enemy would be had it have continued on its reported course toward Midway in order to recover its own aircraft.

Never mind that the position of the enemy as reported to Ring was inaccurate [f/n 98]; at the time it was all he had to go on and, unlike the Yorktown strike, which was delayed, it was not updated after he took his departure.

What did Ring actually say? In his own words he stated, very clearly: - “Upon arrival at the line between the last reported position of the enemy and Midway Island...”

Now, the last reported position of the enemy was that they were on a bearing of 320 degrees from the US fleet and 180 miles out from Midway proceeding at 25 knots on course of 140 degrees. [f/n 99]

The location of Midway Island from the Hornet at the time of launch was at ‘M’ on the first accompanying sketch map below.

And Ring assumed that the enemy would continue on their course toward the island to recover their aircraft strike force and so that it where he would have headed.

I find it difficult to conceive of dyed-in-the-wool 'Brown Shoe' men like Mitscher and Ring, being given the target they most wanted after years of waiting; and believing moreover, as they did, in the importance in getting in the hardest blow as fast as possible, would have diverted their whole force AWAY from the most probably position of the enemy carriers, merely in the nebulous possibility that they MIGHT, maybe, stumble across two more (unreported) carriers. It just does not make sense from any viewpoint to risk sacrificing sinking the KNOWN enemy for the chance of finding one that might be somewhere to the north, some place or other.

Fletcher, after his experiences at the Coral Sea battle, might feel compelled to hold back part of his Yorktown striking force for this reason, but would Mitscher and Ring voluntarily pass up the chance to claim Japanese carrier scalps, I just don’t think so! Ring, according to Alexander Griffin in A Ship to Remember [f/n 100], was a man who, "lived, ate and slept aviation" and was no novice. He had helped form pre-war tactics and had seen more real naval air war than almost anyone present at Midway that day, having been liaison officer aboard the Royal Navy aircraft carrier Ark Royal in the Mediterranean against both the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica as well as the German and Italian fleets. Nor should too much be read into his adopting the 'Search-Attack' formation for his Group, as offered the promise of a broad-fronted approach to enable the whole combined formation to take advantage of the situation, if they found their enemy.

Clay Fisher, who flew as Ring’s wing-man that morning, always felt that they took an outward track of about 239 degrees, just as Walter Lord always maintained. Clay told me [f/n 101]:

“If McClusky had not spotted the Japanese destroyer I think he would have searched for a short time to the north, because he had sighted the smoke from Midway. We will never know whether Ring sighted the smoke, but he must have because it was so visible. All the time our flight was approaching our estimated enemy position I was constantly scanning above and to our right for enemy combat air patrols. If we had been flying on the course of about 265 I would have been scanning to the left. I haven't checked out where enemy carriers were actually positioned on the time-line. If I had been the flight leader I would have changed course to the north for just a few minutes and then turned back to a course to the Hornet. Our fuel amount was becoming critical to the point of no return.”

“After the BOM I always thought VT-8 had changed course to the right, away from our outbound leg. When all the later information commenced to be written about our northerly course I read it in disbelief. That’s one thing I do remember about of June 4th and as I was practically operating on adrenaline those memories are still very vivid in my mind.” Clayton added, "I computed the distance I could see at BOM if I was flying at 16,000 feet. There was no way I could have seen the smoke from Midway if we had flown the 265-270 degree course as alleged." [f/n 102]

Fisher has no verifiable proof, but, then again, nor did Rodee, (who asserted a very different course during a telephone conversation) [f/n 103], when it actually came down to it. Some veterans and others, tried to help locate his Logbook in which this course was recorded, but came to the conclusion that, “Bottom line at this point seems to be that the VS-8 Commander’s Log Book went down with the Hornet at Santa Cruz.” [f/n 104] Ronald Russell of the BOMRT wrote to me that: “When Rodee was citing course ‘about 260 to 265’ in his interviews [actually a phone conversation] with Bowen Weisheit and Jim Sawruck, it seems very likely he was doing that from memory rather than from the Log itself. That’s suggested by the indistinct course he gave Weisheit and the fact that he didn’t want to send Sawruck copies of his log pages.” [f/n 105] Clayton Fisher told me he had spoken to John Rodee twice requesting permission to send me a copy of his father's flight log, but received no response so perhaps he is unable to find it. I have also contacted Mr Rodee requesting permission to view and copy the appropriate page.

Fisher also stated; "Frankly I don't see how he would have his father's log book with entries from BOM. Rodee, to my best memory, only led VS-8 on the initial launch June 4th. He did not fly June 5th and, I believe, the XO of VS-8 led the two missions on June 6th. Normally a squadron clerk made the flight log entries after a flight, of the plane's serial number, length of the flight and a designation number of the type of flight. Unless Rodee's flight log was full after BOM and a new log book started and Rodee sent the old log book home, I feel his log book must have been lost when the Hornet was later sunk. [at the Battle of Santa Cruz]. My flight log book and a few other flight log books of VB-8 were saved by a VB-8 pilot, Art Cason, when the Hornet Air group abandoned her before the ship's company personnel. Cason was able to step from the Hornet's tilted flight deck to a cantilevered (sic) wing of a destroyer and not get the log books wet." [f/n 106] Fisher also said: "Rodee was flying in the second launch that morning and would have not been able to personally try and save his log book because he never landed back on the Hornet. I'm one of the few Hornet pilots that have their log books, thanks to Cason. So I don't understand how Rodee may have had his log book, unless the old was completed at Midway and a new one started after that battle." [f/n 107] If, somehow, Rodee's June 4th log did manage to survive Hornet's subsequent sinking, I personally have not yet seen it to enable examination and verification, but continue to look forward to the opportunity.

Above: Commander Walter Rodee. (Tom Lea).

By contrast, as above, Clayton Fisher still possesses his own personal log book entry for that mission, which he allowed me to see and Xerox, and that states clearly in the Remarks column, “Sent to attack Jap carriers”; it does not say “Search” as it does on the preceding day’s entry. That would seem to indicate a specific attack mission rather than an optimistic hunt. I reproduced that page in my book [f/n 108], and have frequently made it quite clear that I would very happily and willingly include a reproduction of Rodee’s Log Book page also as proof of a different course; but, so far, no search has apparently unearthed this Log Book with its evidence to enable me to do so.

I have now obtained a full copy of one piece of evidence that might be expected to prove beyond doubt that alleged "due west" outward course, Lieutenant Commander John G. Foster, Jr’s Action Report No. 7. Foster was the Air Operations Officer on Mitscher's staff on 4th June. This Action Report is CINCPAC Battle of Midway - Lt. Cmdr. J. G. Foster's Report [f/n 109]. Does it blame the failure of Hornet's initial strike on a Mitscher/Ring outward course of 260 degrees? Well, actually, no, it does not. What Foster did say is this:-

"(a) At 041550 intercepted a message from a patrol plane to Midway giving information that enemy planes were heading toward Midway with bearing of 320 degrees and distance of 150 miles"

(b) At 041809 received the information listed in (a) on the Fox schedule.

(c) At 041823 received information on Fox schedule giving position of enemy; 2 CV's and Main Body, bearing 320, distance 180, course 1356, speed 25.

(d) At 041853 received orders from O.T.C. via visual to launch attack group, employ search-attack procedure and each group attack one carrier. Deferred departure was ordered.

(e) At 041900 started launching attack group and eight plane combat patrol.

(f) At 041942 completed launching attack group 10 VF, 34 VSB and 15 VTB plus 8 VF for combat patrol.

(g) At 042016 Enterprise broke radio silence on 6290 kcs (combat patrol frequency) to direct fighter for intercepting unidentified aircraft."

Foster stated that the original contact report planes heading for Midway was received on Fox schedule 2 hours and 19 minutes after receipt of original report and that the first report of enemy's position, course and speed was received 2 hours and 33 minutes after enemy planes had been sighted headed for Midway. Furthermore, the orders to launch and attack were received 30 minutes after receipt of contact report. No Point Option was given but, in lieu thereof, closing of the enemy was indicated. Due to deferred departure being adopted, the Hornet group did not proceed toward destination until about 45 minutes after start of launching, or 1 hour and 15 minutes after receipt of contact report. No information on enemy course and speed was received from 1823 until 2200, a period of 3 hours and 37 minutes after original contact report or 3 hours after launching of attack group. In total about 3 hours and 25 minutes elapsed between the launching and indication of starting attack. Foster concluded; "The 2 hour and 19 minute delay on the Fox schedule of the original contact.....is entirely too great a time lag and indicates that only direct communication is sufficient. This is especially so where aircraft are involved. He also concluded- "The period of 2 hours and 33 minutes between the sighting of enemy planes approaching Midway and the report of enemy surface force position, course and speed was entirely too long and inadequate under the conditions obtaining and especially so in as much as the enemy's tactics conformed to prior estimates" [f/n 110].

Foster concluded:-"The lack of information on the enemy's surface forces between 0623 and 1000 was serious and jeopardized the tactical advantage we enjoyed over the enemy. The delay of the Enterprise's air group attack against the enemy carriers and the failure of the Hornet's VSB planes to make contact with the enemy can be attributed to this lack of information. Further, the loss of planes from the Hornet and Enterprise by water landings from lack of fuel can be partly attached to this unfortunate lack of information on the enemy's movements." Note that in this report there is not a single word about a westerly course being adopted by Hornet's attack group. However, when Major Weisheit, himself a Navigation expert of high-standing, many years later telephone Admiral Foster, Jr, (as he had by then become), Foster stated that all the Hornet's aircraft, "were tracked straight out to the limit of the ship's radar (about 50-60 miles) on a heading of almost due west" [f/n 111], a course which Rodee, also on the telephone, later confirmed as 260-265. These views must command respect, albeit that, to date at least, no written confirmation of the claims made in these two telephone memories seem to have been unearthed yet.

Both Major Bowen P Weisheit's Last Flight of Ensign Kelly, and Black Shoe Carrier Admiral therefore asserted with some confidence that the outward course adopted by Ring was almost due westward, but so far only appear to cite verbal memories. I have yet to see any examples of actual printed source material to flesh these memories out, although almost every other statement made is meticulously sourced. I have requested sight of such proof, but without result or response. As recorded above, I have tried myself to locate the Rodee Log Book and Hornet Radar Report that such views are apparently based upon. Again, I repeat, I am still searching for them and still hoping they will appear. However, the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, advised me [f/n 112], that the ships radar report itself is not available, because - "RADAR, radio, quartermaster, flight, medical, and engineering logs are considered temporary records and are part of the US Navy's schedule of the disposition of records." They added- "... the only permanent log retained by the US Navy are the deck logs of commissioned US Naval vessels." In response to a request for a further search, NWCT2R replied [f/n 113], that: "We are unable to locate the record that you have requested. I reviewed the action report provided by the USS Hornet contained as an enclosure in a final report filed with CINCPAC. I also checked the other support enclosures and was unable to locate a report by Lieutenant Fleming."

Likewise, the Radar Log of the cruiser Atlanta (CL-51) has not been preserved in the National Archives. It would have been a valuable plotting source as her place was "at force center and guide". Her Deck Log exists and I have a copy but it merely confirms the ships course and speed. Thus at 0639 on the morning of 4th June, Atlanta "turned to course 040 degrees (t & pgc) and at 0653 changed course again to 060 degrees (t & pgc)" [f/n 114]. At 0810 "Japanese ships reported to southwest. Manoeuvred (sic) at various courses at high speed, launching and recovering planes." At 1008, almost two hours after the enemy carrier sighting report had been received, "Both carrier air groups launched for attack" and at 1025 "Sighted enemy plane to south" [f/n 115].

How then did those who cite Hornet's Radar Log as evidence, come to view it? Did Hornet's radar log alone somehow escape the fate that all other USS ships radar logs suffered, and, if it somehow did, where is it? The Hornet's deck log most certainly states that, at 1300, "Picked up large group of planes bearing 260 true, distant 56 miles. 1312 Sighted planes of our group returning from morning flight. 1312 Turned into wind and commenced recovering aircraft." [f/n 116]. That certainly confirms the return flight path of part of Ring's force searching around for their home base, which had moved on in the two hours plus since take-off without giving them any Point Option, but there is nothing recorded in this Log about the tracking of the original outward course of Hornet's Attack Group. If there was indeed a conspiracy for some kind of cover-up, as some claim, in order to hide from posterity the "real" outward course, how did this piece of evidence escape alteration intact?

Also, although Major Weisheit, stated that Hornet's VS-8 squadron, "...flew straight out, turned around, and flew straight back", the Hornet herself had moved on in the intervening period. Had the VS squadron flown "straight back" [f/n 117] along the same alleged 265 degree course as they had left the carrier at 0742, they would have found themselves at 1100, far to the north of their mobile base. The Hornet's deck log shows that at 0800 she was position 31 39N, 176 13 W; at 1200 the Hornet logged a position of 30 40N, 176 31W. After that initial launch Hornet had turned to course 240 true at 1006 and from 1130 for the rest of the day it was recorded that "The base course for the rest of the day was 280 true... We steamed on the base course at 30 knots, closing the Enterprise except when conducting flight operations." [f/n 118]. If they had flown out at 260 degrees they would have had to return on a course of approximately 270 - 280 degrees as viewed from the ship in order to reach Hornet's new position. If they were not receiving Hornet's Zed-Baker transmissions they could have returned from either a 260 or a 240 course and, only when some fifty-miles out, have picked up the signal that steered them in on a 260 course as reported, so this final lap course proves little either way as to their original departure course.

While no Point Option had been given to the airborne squadrons, VS-8 eventually found home base, but the route cannot have been "straight back". If they had taken an outward departure route of 265 true, the most direct route home must have diverged from that by some measure or other. How much? Weisheit's re-drawn map [f/n 119] show Rodee's VS-8 squadron turning south in a large arc at the end of their outward run, before heading back, but even with this generous allowance, the two courses, outward and homeward, still diverge, although not as much as a tighter turn and "straight back" course reversal would have done.

Ring stated that due to the fact that, on aborting, he could only pick up the Enterprise's YE homing signal, and that the two Spruance carriers were anyway found to have been transmitting different homing codes, because they had been changed by the CTF but that the change had not been received in Hornet. Ring therefore (a) could not hear Hornet's homing signal, (b) disregarded the Enterprise different homing signal and instead (c) navigated by dead reckoning, taking Rodee's unit with him. "VS-8 under Lt-Cdr Rodee followed me in my change," However, Ring stated, VB-8 and VF-8, initially, "...appeared to follow the false course..." [f/n 120] Clayton Fisher argued that Rodee, "...probably may have made a small course direction indicated by the YE signal..." [f/n 121] but this is only conjecture.

The Hornet was equipped with SC-1 (S for Search, C for Model 3, under BuShips classification) long-wave search radar set at the time of Midway, with an "A" scope, provision for IFF connections and worked with a gyro-compass repeater. The 90 ft rectangular Antenna atop the tripod top of the ships mainmast, had a reliable maximum range of thirty miles with a preamplifier, or 75 miles with a preamplifier, against medium bombers at an altitude of 1,000 ft, with a ranging accuracy of plus or minus 200 yards. The deck log confirms aircraft were being picked up at least 50-plus miles on this apparatus on 4th June. The scope was operated by a single RdM2 (Radarman Second Class), J. S. Poffenberger, reporting to the Fighter Direction Officer, usually a Lieutenant (s.g.) and in Hornet's case at Midway; this was Lieutenant Allan Foster Fleming, (W & Jr. D, V1 and Fly 2, on Hornet's Fighter Control Plot) and a real expert at the job. [f/n 122]

Unfortunately for the "due west radar plot" theory, Rear-Admiral Fleming's son, Colonel Allan F. "Chips" Fleming, Jr., told me that most of his father's personal papers were pitched after he died. "I was stationed overseas at the time and was not able to prevent their destruction." [f/n 123] There is also no mention of any such radar plot in Malcolm LeCompte's article in the USNI's Naval History article. [f/n 124] So, that being the case, then where exactly did that radar plot, said to have recorded a "almost due west" outward heading for Ring, come from other than memory?

Nor is there any Rodee personal War Diary or memoir of these events either, which might offer an alternative source to the elusive Log Book, or, if there is, it has not yet been produced either and Rodee never mentioned it to some of the expert Midway researches he later confided in. If such source or sources still actually exist, then fine, I will most certainly and unreservedly accept this prognosis, indeed embrace it, but I have, so far anyway, not seen any. So for those who actually have them, or have seen them, why not share it with the rest of us? I'm from England, not Missouri, but, as Harry S. Truman said, "Show me!” If not, then the assertions made that a “cover up” on a grand scale was done by Mitscher, which have been, and continue to be, made, are, at least, open to debate.

The Hornet's deck log [f/n 125] states that at 0855, she and her escorting cruisers and destroyers, "...left formation and turned into wind to launch aircraft. Steadied on 158 true. Launched air patrol. Launched attack group of 34 scout bombers, 15 torpedo bombers and 10 escorting fighters. Mission is enemy concentration approaching Midway from the northwest. [f/n 126]

Another question. Would Mitscher and his staff, as the most junior of the three carrier commanders, (subordinate moreover to Spruance as well as Fletcher and, ultimately, Nimitz), have had the audacity to unilaterally make such a search, rather than strike the known and given enemy as ordered? It must be considered doubtful.

Mitscher, of course, is currently demonised on Internet Forums, despite the fact that he had an aviation background rather than being one of the JCL ("Johnny Come Lately"), non-aviators who had special flight school Primary and Basic Air Training, later in their careers, in order to command carriers, seaplane tenders and Naval Air Stations. Among such JCL's were King, Halsey, McCain, Sherman and Reeves. This "five carrier landings and take-offs" minimum requirement was mandatory under the recommendations of President Calvin Coolidge's President's Aircraft Board (the so-called "Morrow Board") which were incorporated in the 1927 Public Law Legislation passed by the 69th Congress. Section 3 of these Statues at Large of the United States stipulated that "Line officers detailed to command of aircraft carriers or aircraft tenders shall be naval aviators or naval aviation observers who are otherwise qualified." There was no requirement, however, for a Flag Officer or Admiral in charge of a carrier force to be either an aviator or an observer, which is just as well as neither Fletcher nor Spruance, let alone Nimitz, would have met such a requirement at Midway. Instead they were both forced to rely on their Air Staffs, while the experienced, but junior, Captain Mitscher had his own hand-picked team of equally air-minded officers. Mitscher and his team are currently criticised for failing to adopt the new technology appertaining to flying operations (ZB/YE etc), and yet the evidence of Clayton Fisher is that he flew many earlier scouting missions from the Hornet that were totally reliant on this new apparatus and that it was easy to use and never failed him. Ring certainly managed to reason out the two differing signals from the two carriers of his group and fly straight back to his base from the first mission, even if many of his fighter pilots, who turned back earlier, did not. So this remains a moot point.

Additionally, I have been severely taken to task by some for mentioning that Elmer B Potter, among many others, has expressed the view that, had Halsey been in charge, he would have fought Midway in a very different [f/n 127] manner to Fletcher. “Not possible”, I have been advised; because Nimitz’s battle plan was too tightly drawn, (even though Nimitz himself stated it was “not mandatory”). Yet one critic was to write of Browning's unsatisfactory advice to Spruance that; "Had Halsey been at Midway, he could have been expected to know what to ask and when precisely to step in. The mounting of the great TF-16 strike might not have become the fiasco it was, the neglect of Point Option could have been averted, and the aggressive Halsey might have prevented the lethargy that followed recovery of the morning attack." [f/n 128]

However, even if one accepts, against the evidence, that it was a very tight plan, and if, therefore a maverick like Halsey is deemed to have been so completely constrained that he would not have deviated from it, then how on earth could the most junior of those in command, Mitscher, have had the temerity to opt for his own “take” on Spruance’s and Nimitz’s instruction and not gone anyplace else but straight for the known enemy?

Would Halsey have done things differently? Dusty Kleiss is very clear that Halsey would have adopted a vastly different approach, he wrote [f/n 129] how, following his experiences on 7th December 1941, "Halsey immediately ignored his 'U.S. Naval Doctrine of March 1941', prescribing a 'Combined Attack', since it was illogical with the three [types of] airplanes under his Command. Two were obsolete, had very short ranges, and had horrible weaponry; the other one was modern, had twice their range and had reliable weaponry. Their speeds and stalls were so different, that a massed group flying at the same speed (100 knots for our TBD's carrying a torpedo) was ludicrous. Based on our Marshall Islands attacks and other battles, Halsey came to the following conclusions: 1. Our SBD's with their stepped-down formation and frequent gunnery drills had fairly good protection against enemy fighters. 2. Our F4F's with numerous gun failures, were desperately needed to protect our Carriers. SBD's did not need them. 3. TBD's might be used on short scouting missions; they would not be used in battle except against unprotected, stationary targets. 4. Whenever enemy airplanes might threaten us, our planes should make a dog-leg home, to avoid the enemy knowing the location of our carrier. 5. The most qualified pilot should lead formations; not necessarily the most senior one. We VS-6 pilots were instructed by Earl Gallaher to keep our position plotted in a Latitude and Longitude diagram in the right-hand corner of our plotting board. That way we could easily calculate the enemy position in a few seconds; much easier than a reference to Midway. We did plot Midway, since we were told to make a 40-mile dog-leg heading there, before heading home. We SBD's were to strike the enemy immediately, when the enemy's location, course and speed were known. No TBD's or F4F's were going with us." [f/n 130]

Now, if that scenario is truly what was in Halsey's mind, then I think I may be reasonably justified in claiming that he would have fought the battle differently to Fletcher! Nor am I alone in thinking thus, as I have indicated.

Dusty Kleiss also informed me that; "Dick Best and possible Earl Gallaher listened intently to what Admiral Nimitz wanted us to do in our Ambush Attack. Nimitz recorded the expected dates, ships, courses and sequences he had learned from his Code group. He pointed out the most vulnerable spot us to attack the enemy carriers, and even their most likely courses while heading to Midway. Only SBD's were involved; our other planes lacked enough range for a surprise attack. Sending out our SBD's on searches to find enemy carriers would make any ambush impossible... searches by some other means was essential. Earl Gallaher talked with us section leaders about all he had learned, either from Nimitz or from Dick Best. We huddled at one end of the ready room. Had any combined attack been planned by Nimitz, we would have been given charts or diagrams or other schedules or groupings, just like Halsey had previously done. All that was lacking." He added- "I knew Halsey fairly well, and talked with him several times. He never gave good words about Fletcher or thought that the Coral Sea battle was done properly", adding, "....Earl Gallaher and Dick Best felt the same...each carefully avoided any mention of Fletcher in any speech. Another friend wrote me. 'The best action Fletcher ever did, was to turn over his command to Spruance!'" Dusty concluded - "I searched diligently for some reason for Fletcher to be away from his directed location at dawn on the 4th June, but found none. He had no boiler problem. I wish I could give a higher report on Fletcher, but facts are facts." [f/n 131].

Mitscher and his staff have been severely castigated as, “epitomising the know-it-all attitude” [f/n 132] (a verdict which some might indeed consider degenerating by the way!) but on Day One of the battle Mitscher actually “knew” relatively little. And, as the morning’s events developed, he was told even less. He lacked the security-cleared coders able to transcribe Nimitz’s later Intelligence updates, and from which the Yorktown’s staff benefited enormously in planning their own, later, strike. Ring leading the Hornet strike force aloft was ever worse-served, for what very little fresh information that percolated through to Mitscher, and that was scanty enough. It was stated in Hornet's Battle Report that information pertaining to the change of course by the Nagumo carriers was not passed on to Ring due to the need to maintain radio silence. However, Hornet's Communications Officer, Lieutenant-Commander Oscar H. Dobson, firmly maintained to the end of his life that no such information was ever de-ciphered aboard Hornet in the first place, so could not be passed on anyway. [f/n 133] Like McClusky, Ring only had the original sightings to base his best “guestimate” upon.

The serious charge levelled against Mitscher is said to be based on numerous “testimonies” and his accuser is stated to have based his allegation on these by clearly, “citing documented sources, largely original, for every significant statement in the manuscript.” But where, I ask, is the actual citation for this charge against Mitscher; there is no footnote indicator here, as elsewhere, indicating any written, provable evidence, [as indignantly demanded in the case of Fletcher], for the case claiming the alleged Mitscher cover-up. I have personally requested sight of this evidence myself, without eliciting any response to date. That is entirely their right to decide of course, but then, if not to me, why not release it generally?

Personal memories apart then, three documents are relevant as bearing witness to Mitscher’s alleged deceit, (1) The Log Book of Rodee, in which he said over the telephone that he had recorded a course of 265 degrees; (2) The Radar Log of the Hornet, presumably originating from Lieutenant Fleming, which is said to have tracked Ring out on a course of about “due west”, (3) The “Secret” J G Foster critique. These are cited as “proof positive” of Mitscher’s guilt. If these documents do so show, then, case closed, Mitscher would surely be guilty as charged. So why not let us look at them in a little more detail and see what their actual value is as irrefutable evidence.

Well, that’s a problem, we can’t. And we can’t because it would appear, they seem to be generally unavailable for examination, at least as far as we know, as we have already stated. So, IF that is, and remains, actually the case, how do these three documents rate as “testimonies”?

(1) The Rodee Log Book as distinct from his memory. If it can be produced, and if it shows in Rodee’s handwriting 265 degrees or similar, then, case proven. If it cannot, (and to date, as far as I am aware, it has not) then it is merely anecdotal evidence, of no use one way or the other as firm evidence.

(2) The Hornet Radar Log – If it can be produced, and if it shows official recorded tracking Ring at 265 degrees or similar, then, case proven. If it cannot, (and to date, as far as I am aware, it has not) then it is merely anecdotal evidence, of no use one way or the other as firm evidence.

(3) J. G. Fosters "Secret Critique" as distinct from his memory– If it can be produced, and if it contains written official evidence of tracking Ring at 265 degrees or similar, then, case proven. If it cannot, (and to date, as far as I am aware, it has not) then it is merely anecdotal evidence, of no use one way or the other as firm evidence.

Therefore until these three cited written evidences are made public, or indeed any one of them, these entire positive documentary proofs surely just melt away to become unsubstantiated allegations. Maybe there is a number (4) document, not hitherto mentioned, which would represent firm written proof, or a number (5), or more. But until they are produced and exhibited, how can the charge against Mitscher be anything other than allegation based on hearsay? Hardly proof enough to hang a man, or even ruin his reputation. Together the verbal memories are powerful and strong indications of the conspiracy theory, but are they scientifically sufficient to say, with total certainty, case proven?

So let us return to some clues to seek another possible scenario to this puzzle. To do that lets us examine the two alternative courses under dispute.

If we draw a line on a course from the Hornet Group’s departure point at H, until it meets the spot “between the last reported position of the enemy and Midway Island”, you will surely have the spot where Ring said he had taken his force. He said “between the last reported position and Midway”, not astern of, or to the north of, the last reported position. Plot what course would have taken him there from the Hornet, on about 236 degrees and at a distance of 178 miles. The position would have been approximately ‘X’. This would have been Ring’s “Estimated Point of Contact” [f/n 134] or Waldron’s “down there” [f/n 135], an estimate which the latter personally rejected for he was convinced that the enemy would have turned north well before then, which as we now know, they did.

So I ask the following questions with a completely open mind, and because sometimes people misinterpret statements to suit their own convictions, I again emphatically stress that they are not hard-and-fast “assertions” but possibilities to be considered in coming to a conclusion.

Would a course of 265 degrees, to 178 miles and then out again to 225 miles, as stated on the phone by Rodee, have taken Ring’s force to a position between “the last reported position of the enemy and Midway Island?” No.

Would a course of 260 degrees to “due west” as speculated by many other historians, have taken him to a position “between the last reported position of the enemy and Midway Island?” No.

At Ring’s estimated desired position would Clayton Fisher, have been able to see the single column smoke from the burning oil tank at Midway as he avers? In the latter case the answer is Yes, for that column of smoke was visible for a maximum of ‘50’ miles out from Midway, depending on altitude of the aircraft.

But could Fisher, who was at 12,000 feet altitude once the force, fatally, turned south at 225 miles out, see it then? Only if he was already well to the south, for at that height he would have to have been at a maximum of only twenty-five distant from Midway. Whereas a “postulated due west” initial departure would have had him many miles beyond such a visible sighting.

Then surely the course adopted by Ring to reach “X” on my diagram below, must have been approximately 236 and not 260-265 degrees, or “due west”, as claimed?

The irony seems to escape some that Fletcher, (who undoubtedly and without question certainly did despatch some of his aircraft to search away from the two reported Nagumo Force’s expected line of approach in order to hunt at short range for two non-confirmed enemy carriers, and who held back other aircraft from the main attack, just in case they turned up), to be wise and sagacious for so doing; OK – so it may have been, but why then are Mitscher and Ring, (who, without written proofed evidence, are only alleged to have directed their attack at the same mythical ships), conversely adjudged incompetents for doing much the same thing, i.e. looking for the “missing” carriers!

Incidentally I have also been taken to task for reporting that the Fletcher morning search, “found nothing” [f/n 136]. This statement has been termed “arrogant” [f/n 137], but “nothing” is precisely what they did find, because there was nothing there for them to find– this is just a simple fact, which any writer on the subject would be obliged to record. Here is how Captain Buckmaster recorded the incident to Admiral Nimitz: "The search returned at about 0830 with negative results..." [f/n 138] Is this also to be deemed arrogant!

Maybe 265 degrees was indeed the course Hornet’s first strike took that June 4th; maybe we will never know, but might we not at least consider that Mitscher and his team were not subsequently totally concerned with covering their backs? That Ring might just possibly have taken a similar course to McClusky, but turned south and not north, (as he fully admits to), thus missing the providential sighting of the returning Japanese destroyer, which led McClusky to the target? Dare we even consider that there might just have been no conspiracy after all? Or is such consideration itself now considered rank heresy by some? Now there is real arrogance!

Finally, if, as some still most emphatically claim today, Hornet's attack group led by Ring, flew a course of 265 degrees, at the behest of Mitscher, and then arranged for an elaborate plan to cover it all up, then those so making such serious allegations must also have to accept that, as well as the CINCPAC, Admiral Nimitz, the Head of the Navy, Admiral Ernest King himself and his able Chief of Staff and Aide, Vice-Admiral Richard Stanislaus Edwards [f/n 139], must have also have been fully implicated as part-and-parcel of this same alleged plot, or privy to it. Why? Simply because of a document known as Secret Information Bulletin No. 1 from the Command File World War II, entitled Battle Experience from Pearl Harbor to Midway, December 1941 to June 1942 including Makin Island Raid 17-18 August.

This document was prepared by the United States Fleet, Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief and it was issued on February 15, 1943. The whole raison d'etre of these reports was, "...to promulgate reliable information concerning actual War experience". Furthermore they were issued following a considerable delay, so that a "...complete analysis were made before issue to the Fleet." [f/n 140]. This was a considered document at the highest level. This document was de-classified on 27 September 1958 [f/n 141] and a copy was made available to me by the Head, Operational Archives Branch, Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, Washington DC.

Included as an integral part of this document is a map, entitled Battle of Midway 3-6 June 1942. That map clearly shows the track of Hornet's aircraft [f/n 142], (they list Ring's force after the torpedo-bombers had left him, as 35 VSB's and 10 VF's) on that first sortie. Their track is clearly shown, and it is exactly the same course, and a little to the south of, the track taken by McClusky and the Enterprise strike force, 240 degrees, though continuing further out before turning south, exactly as Ring claimed to have done. The citation on that map is that this force, "did not find enemy," and the main reason given is that the Japanese striking force made radical changes of course which was not reported. Compare my estimate map, based solely on Ring's statement, and this US Navy Officially approved and detailed map - the courses are almost identical.

Finally, the Office of Naval Intelligence itself concluded that the, "... reversal of the course of the enemy carriers occurred about an hour after our planes had left the Hornet and the Enterprise. Our carriers did not break radio silence to inform our pilots of this fact. Consequently, the planes failed to find the enemy." [f/n 143] Therefore, if the American carriers had launched earlier from positions closer to the enemy, this time lag would not have existed and they would have stood a better chance of all finding the enemy. If the Mitscher conspiracy theorists are correct then they also, like Admiral King and his staff, must have been a part of the alleged "cover up" also, or have ultimately sanctioned it!

The conspiracy theorists, and they abound, aver that, by stating that his own report was more likely to be accurate than Hornet’s, Spruance was dropping a broad hint that Mitscher had “doctored” his own report. What he was doing was nothing of the sort, Spruance was not that type of man, hints, half-truths and innuendo were no part of his make-up, that is far more the remit of the Internet geeks of a much later, and more cynical  age. What Spruance was stating was the actual truth, which was that he had received more updated information than Mitscher, and much of that information was either not passed on to Mitscher, or if it was, as explained, could not be de-coded aboard Hornet, so was valueless. These were the facts that Spruance was explaining, not hinting at some far-fetched “cover-up” scheme dreamt up on the spur of the moment.

Another strange theory that has more recently been advanced by armchair warriors is that, because the Kido Butai had become somewhat dispersed from their normal cruising formation, they were spread over a larger area and must have been easy to spot from the air had Ring adopted the course he said he did.  The reasoning seemingly being that, as Ring failed to spot the Kido Butai and they in turn did not spot him, then he must have flown a totally different, more northerly search course. Such speculation is, at best, only that – no facts. What it completely fails to take into account is that McClusky failed to spot the Kido Butai either, or be spotted by them. Are they then suggesting that McClusky flew a 260 degree course? Of course they are not; so why should anyone think that this is proof that Ring did. The fact of the matter is that neither Hornet nor Enterprise sighted the enemy on their outward legs, they both failed to see the Nagumo force. Ring turned south thinking that the Japanese had continued along the last known course to recover their strike force, while McClusky turned north, fortunately sighting the Japanese destroyer and then, and only then, came upon Kido Butai.  It seems that every effort is being made to attack Ring’s movements, but not a shred of written evidence has yet been produced to give some substance to these armchair judgements.

It is an unfortunate fact that, away from a home computer in the 21st-century, and back in the wide wastes of the Pacific of 1942, it was very easy indeed not to sight a formation of ships, especially when they were steering a totally different course to that which had been last reported. And both striking forces did miss them on the way out and both probably flew to similar points initially.

Bill Vickery kindly informed me that the Hornet’s Air Operations Officer, Rear-Admiral Johnny Foster, who was a couple of years behind Ring at the Naval Academy, were well acquainted. “He told me of a conversation he had with Ring just after he got back to Hornet. In summary, Ring said to Foster, ‘I don’t know what happened out there – I just don’t know.” Foster described the anguish in Ring’s voice and it was heart-rending.” [f/n 144] Hardly the remote, colourless person as presented by some on Internet sites.

Ring’s son, Vice Admiral Stewart Ring wrote to me that. “For decades authors, many of them rather renowned, have chastised, criticized and blamed my father Stanhope C. Ring for his actions/inactions during the battle. For the first time in my recollection, you and only you, have chosen to look fairly and in an unbiased way on dad’s performance during the battle and I am most grateful to you for both your fairness and your perspicacity.” [f/n 145]

Bill Vickery wrote, “Sometimes I think that Clay and I are the only people who believe that Ring flew on the path described in Mitscher’s action report.” [f/n 146]

To both these gentlemen I say, you are not alone in your thinking. I remain open- minded in contrast to the “theorists” who claim allegations as facts. Whatever the outcome, my research continues to find the truth.

 

 

 

Official USN Map from COMINCH!

Source Notes

94- Enclosure A: A track of the Battle of Midway Composite of All Reports. (CINCPAC Serial 01847, June 28 1942).

95- Bombing Squadron EIGHT (USS Hornet) Operating under Task Force Sixteen U.S. Pacific Fleet Secret Operation. Declassified NND968133, 4/22, National Archives, College Park, MD.

96- Ibid.

97- Commanding Officer, USS Hornet, Serial 0018 of 13 June 1942 Report of Acton 4-6 June 1942.

98- Commander Stanhope Ring, Letter, dated 28 March 1946, copy in Author's files from Mrs Susan Ring Keith. See also "Lost Letter of Midway", Captain Bruce Linder, USN, USNI Proceedings, August, 1999.

99- The PBY piloted by Lieutenant Howard P. Ady, Jr. set three reports, one at 0534 merely stated "Aircraft", while a second, timed 0540 stated "ED (Estimated Distance) 180 sight 320", while a third, timed at 0552 stated "Two carriers and main body of ships, carriers in front, course 135, speed 25."

100- Alexander T. Griffin, A Ship to Remember: The Saga of the Hornet, Howell Soskin, New York, NY, 1943.

101- e-mail, Clayton Fisher to the Author, 01 May 2008 20:55.

102- Ibid.

103- Telephone Conversation, Lieutenant Commander W. E. Rodee, USN, to Major Bowen P. Weisheit, USMCR (Ret.), 1981, quoted in The Last Flight of Ensign Markland Kelly, Jr, USNR, Association of Naval Aviation, Inc., Falls Church, Va, 1993. pp 88.

104- e-mail, Clayton Fisher to the Author, 29 June 2008 19:19.

105- e-mail, Ronald Russell to the Author, 11 January 2007 20:59.

106- e-mail, Clayton Fisher to the Author, Tuesday September 09, 2008 3:28 AM

107- e-mail, Clayton Fisher to the Author, 29 June 2008 19:19.

108- Midway Dauntless Victory, op cit, Illustration #84.

109- 7 pages, 370/44/19/02 in Box 11 REP0006C.

110- My emphasis.

111- Telephone Conversation, Foster to Major Bowen P. Weisheit, USMCR (Ret.) 1981, quoted in The Last Flight of Ensign C. Markland Kelly, Jr, USNR, op cit, pp 53.

112- e-mail, dated 18 July 2008.

113- e-mail, dated 9 September 2008.

114- As logged by Lieutenant V. O. Perkins, USN.

115- As logged by Lieutenant Commander J. S. Smith, Jr., USN.

116- As logged by Lieutenant (j.g.) A. H. Hunker, USN.

117- Major Bowen P. Weisheit, USMCR (Ret.), Last Flight, op cit, pp 50.

118- As logged by Lieutenant (j.g.) A. H. Hunker, USN.

119- Major Bowen P. Weisheit, USMCR (Ret.), Last Flight, op cit, pp 55.

120- Stanhope Ring, Letter, op cit.

121- e-mail, Clayton Fisher to the Author, 29 June 2008 19:19.

122 - Allan Foster Fleming (1912-1987) b. 14 December 1912, Iowa City, Johnson, IA. 1936 Graduated US Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, Commissioned Ensign. 6 June 1937 - Married Helen MacGregor Gray in Milwaukee, WI. Three children, Allan Foster, Jr., Skye MacGregor and Leslie Mitchell MacGregor. 1939 designated Naval Aviator. 1942 at Midway serving aboard Hornet. At Battle of Santa Cruz, Fleming was severely wounded in the face by bomb shrapnel and was treated aboard a Hospital Ship back at Noumea before returning Stateside for recuperation. 1945-46 Commander US Naval Radar Training School and NAS St. Simons Island, GA. 1946 Staff, Commander 8th Fleet. 1946-1947 2nd Task Fleet. 1948 Graduated Army Artillery School. 1950-1951 Air Development Squadron 4. 1954 Naval War College. 1958-1959 Commanded Seaplane Tender Pine Island (AV-12) in Pacific. 1956-1958 Staff of CinC US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic & Mediterranean. 1959-1960 commanded carrier Saratoga (CV-60) in Mediterranean. 1962-1964 Deputy Chief Plans, Allied HQ, Malta GC. 1963 Rear Admiral. 1964-1965 Commanding Attack Carrier Striking Force 6th Fleet. CarDiv 4. 1966-1967 Director Strategic Plans Division, OCNO, Washington, DC. 1967-1969 Assistant Deputy Chief Naval Operations (Policy & Plans). 1970-1972 Commander Fleet Air Mediterranean. Commander Anti-submarine warfare forces, 6th Fleet. Commander Maritime Air Mediterranean, NATO. Legion of Merit. Purple Heart. Distinguished Service Medal. d. 21 January 1987, La Jolia, CA. Cremated, ashes spread at sea off Point Loma, San Diego, CA. Incidentally, Fleming's Brother-in-Law, James S. Gray, Jr. was Squadron Commander of VF-6 at Midway.

123- e-mail, Allan Fleming, Jr., to the Author, 13 August 2008 14:04.

124- Malcolm A. LeCompte, USNR, Radar and the Air Battle of Midway, in Naval History, USNI, Annapolis, MD, Summer 1992 edition.

125- As recorded by Lieutenant (j.g.) A. H. Hunker, USN.

126- My emphasis - notice that the mission target is precisely recorded as the enemy ships approaching Midway, and not a search for some nebulous, as yet unlocated, enemy carriers somewhere to the north.

127- Note - not necessarily better, but different.

128- Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, op cit, pp 200.

129- e-mail, Kleiss to the Author (and others) Thursday, August 28, 2008 9:10 PM.

130- e-mail, Kleiss to the Author, 17 September 2008 01:17.

131- Ibid.

132- Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, op cit, pp 515.

133 - Dodson, Rear-Admiral Oscar Henry (1905-1996). b. Houston, Texas, 3rd January 1905. son of Dennis S. and Margaret Sisk Bounds (nee Sisk). Waco Texas High School. 1923 Appointed to USNA, Annapolis by Senator Tom Connally. Graduated B.S., USNA 1927, commissioned as Ensign. 1927-28 served aboard the battleship New York (BB-34 ), BatDiv 2, Scouting Fleet. 1928- Asiatic Station aboard the destroyer Preble (DD-345 ) and Edsall (DD-219 ) ) then the armoured cruiser Pittsburgh (CA-4 ) Flagship, Asiatic Fleet. 1931 - Torpedo School, Newport, RI. 17 December 1932 married Pauline Wellbrock, one son, John Dennis. 1933 joined American Numismatic Association. 1932-34 served aboard the destroyer Dupont (DD- 152) and Breckenridge (DD-148 ), then the battleship Idaho (BB-42 ). 1934-36 US Navy Postgraduate School, Applied Communications course. 1936-40 Communications Officer heavy cruiser Vincennes (CA-44), operating under CNO, Navy Department. 1940 Assistant District Communications Officer, Third Naval District, New York. 1941-42 as Lieutenant-Commander, Communications Officer of carrier Hornet (CV-8) at Midway and Santa Cruz battles. Awarded Silver Star. 1942 transferred to staff of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid and then Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, aboard carrier Enterprise (CV-6) 1943 - On staff of Rear Admiral Aldred E. Montgomory, CarDiv 2 aboard the carrier Essex (CV-9) Wake, Rabaul and Gilbert ops. 1944 - Staff Communications Officer aboard carrier Bunker Hill (CV-17) Marshalls, Truk, Marianas, Palau, Hollandia, Truk, Marianas Battle of Philippine Sea. 20 March 1945, Captain. XO of light cruiser Topeka (CL-67), TF 38/58 Okinawa and Japanese bombardments. 1945-49 Head of Mobilization Plans, Bureau of Naval Personnel. 1949-50 commanded Attack Transport Thomas Jefferson (APA-30) in Pacific with Military Transportation Service. June 1950-53 Professor Navigation Sciences and Master's Degree Russian History, Urbana, Illinois. 1953-55 Commander Landing Ship Flotilla Two, Atlantic Fleet. 1953 University of Illinois, M.A. 1954-56 Chief, Naval Mission to Greece. 1956-57 CofS First Naval District, Boston, MA. 1957 retired from Navy with rank of Rear-Admiral. Silver Star, three Presidential Unit Citations. 1957-59 Assistant Professor of History, Urbana, Illinois. 1949 American Numismatic Association, (President 1956-60). Fellow Royal Numismatic Society, London. 1959-65 Director Detroit Money Museum, MI. 1966- Director of Classical and European Culture. ANA Farran Zerbe Memorial Award (1068) and ANA Lifetime Achievement Award (1995). d. Urbana, Illinois, 22nd January 1996. Author of Money Tells the Story, 1962, and numerous Numismatic articles.

134- Stanhope Ring, Letter, op cit.

135- George Gay, Sole Survivor: The Battle of Midway and the Effect on his Life, Naples Ad/Graphics Services, Naples, Fl. 1979.

136- Midway Dauntless Victory, op cit, pp 75.

137- CWO Ronald W. Russell, USNR(Ret.), Naval History, USNI Annapolis, MD, July 2008 edition, pp 68.

138- Commanding Officer, USS Yorktown to Commander-in-Chief US Pacific Fleet. Action Report: USS Yorktown (CV-5) dated 18 June 1942, CV5/A16-3 (CCR-10-oah).

139- Richard Stanislaus Edwards (1885-1956) b. Philadelphia, PA. 18 February 1885. 1896-1903 Episcopal Academy, Philadelphia. U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD. 1903. 1907 Graduated. Commissioned as Ensign 13 September 1908. 1913 As Lieutenant, commanded submarine C-3. 11 August 1914 married Hallie Ninan Snyder. Engineering Officer battleship Kentucky (BB-6). Gunnery Officer battleship Arkansas (BB-21). 1919-1921 Aide to Commander Battleship Squadron One. August 1924-June 1926 commanded destroyer Wood (DD-317). April- September 1931, Aide to CinC U.S. Fleet. 1931-1934 Staff Command & General Staff. 1935 Graduated Naval War College, Newport, RI. 1937-1940 Commanded SubRon 6. Commanded Submarine Base, New London, Con. June-October 1940, Commanded battleship Colorado (BB-45). 1941 Commanded Submarines, Patrol Force. February-December 1941 Commanded Submarines, Atlantic Fleet. May 1941 Rear Admiral. December 1941- October 1944 Deputy CofS. 1942 Vice Admiral. Aide, CinC, U.S. Fleet. 1944-1945 Deputy CinC, U.S. Fleet and Deputy CNO. Distinguished Service Medal. Vice Chief Naval Operations. 1947 Commander Western Sea Frontier. January-July 1947 Commander, Pacific Reserve Fleet. 13 April 1945 Admiral. 1 July 1947 Navy Cross. Retired List. Lived San Francisco, CA. d. Naval Hospital, Oakland, CA 2 June 1956. Destroyer Richard S. Edwards (DD-950) named in his honour.

140- My emphasis.

141- DOD, DIR.5200.9

142-They list 35 VSB's and 10 VF's.

143- Office of Naval Intelligence, The Battle of Midway June 3-6, 1942, Combat Narrative - Observations.

144- Bill Vickery to the Author, dated Tuesday October 20th 2009.

145- Vice-Admiral Stewart Ring to the Author, dated September 11th 2009.

146- Bill Vickery to the Author, dated Tuesday October 20th 2009.

© World Right Reserved, Peter C Smith, 2009

MIDWAY DAUNTLESS VICTORY

The statue of the warrior Masahige in Tokyo

At the home of Iyuzo Fujita Zero Ace

The gated entrance to the Imperial Palace Gardnes, Tokyo

With Takeshi Maeda in Tokyo

Statue of Maswira Omura at the Yasakuni Shrine, Tokyo

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RESEARCH TRIPS TO JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

One of the false charges levelled at me is that I did not use original sources in my research for Midway Dauntless Victory. This would be laughable if it were not so utterly untrue. Although I have had all the relevant Microfilms and Xerox copies of the participants at home for many years of study, I firmly believe in getting away from my office and computer and actually talking to those who were there, as well as examining the original documents concerned with the battle. Only by getting "hands-on" can one discover fresh material rather than re-vamping tired old theories to suit their own particular prejudice, as so many seem to do nowadays. In order to conduct a proper and original study as befitting a serious major work on the Battle of Midway, I undertook four specific visits, two to Japan and two to the United States in these years. In all four I interspaced research visits to centres of learning and major archives, with visits to the homes of participants and veterans for face-to-face interviews. As before, my guide in Japan was my old friend Commander Sadao Seno, JMDF, Rtd.

Tea-making ceremony by Mr Suzo Inaba at Kure

With Sadao Seno and Commandant Etajima Training College

The upper balcony of the Great Hall, Etajima

 

 

Sadoa Seno with preserved naval gunsa at Etajima

With Sadao Seno at Etajima

Starting in Tokyo I visited once more the Military History Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies and talked with Takeshi Maeda, Iyozo Fujita, Taemi Ichikawa and other veterans. Then it was down to Kure via the "Bullet" train where I was presented with the traditional Tea Ceremony, hosted by Shuzo Inaba and his family. Next day I was received at the famed Etajima training college as an Admiral rather than an historian, with full honours and was personally guided around the facilities and archives by Vice-Admiral Doke, Rear Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano and Rear Admiral Kobayashi.

On the West Coast trip to the USA my wife and I stayed with our good friend Peggy Olds, widow of Bob Olds, the historian, who put her home at Santa Barbara once more at our disposal as a base. From here we various flew or drove to Coronado, the San Diego Aerospace Museum and San Antonio, Texas to interview veterans in person and conduct debates. On the East Coast visit a few weeks later, I was based successively in Chicago, Newport R.I., Washington D.C., New York and Darien, Conn. conducting archives research at the various facilities including the National Archives; the Naval Historical Center at Washington Navy Yard; the National Air and Space Museum and the Naval War College, at all of which I was treated with the utmost courtesy. I also interviewed many more American veterans and historians on the battle.

Finally, back home, further research was conducted at the Churchill College archive at Cambridge, the National Archives, Kew, London, the Fleet Air Arm Museum, Yeovil ton amongst many, before finally getting down to putting all my notes, tape recordings and documents together for the book, which was finally published in the UK in November 2007. Whether it was all worth-while is for the readers to judge.

 

RESEARCH VISIT TO JAPAN

On an earlier research visit, I spent some time in Japan and with my friends and fellow historians Sadao Seno and Tetsukuni Watanabe, visited historical centres, museums, military shrines as well as meeting surviving Val pilots in their homes. In addition to the usual tourist events, Mount Fuji, riding the Bullet train, shopping and night-life in downtown Tokyo, Nagoya Castle, the Kamkura's Gardens and Great Buddha,and so on, my wife and I were welcomed at places tourists rarely, if ever, see. We visited the preserved battleship Mikasa, Admiral Togo's flagship at the Battle of Tsushima when the Russian fleet was totally destroyed. Restored to pristine condition, thanks to the intervention in the 1950's of John Rubin a native of Barrow-in-Furness where she had been constructed half-a-century before, Mikasa is now the Japanese equivalent of H.M.S. Victory and just as historic. We were welcomed aboard with due ceremony by Vice-Admiral Tameo Oki, the Executive Director, who personally guided us around the ship.

 

With the famous dive-bomber pilot Zenji Abe, a veteran of Pearl Harbor and many combat missions, as our guide, we were guests of Chief Priest, the Reverend Tadashi Yuzawa at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. Here we attended a memorial service to honour the memory of Val pilot Takashige Egusa, whose life story I had recorded many years earlier. This was a particular honour for us, and especially for my wife Pat, for women are rarely granted access to such ceremonies. We were also shown around the Museum by the Curator, and viewed the only surviving Judy dive-bomber which is preserved there.

Another unique honour was our attendance of the Pre-Sailing Reception for the departure of the Japanese Navy's Training Squadron for their South American cruise. Here we were guests of The Suiko Association, and met veterans of the Pacific War, while my wife was attended upon by the young female sailors of the new Navy of Japan.

 

South, to Aichi Province, where the original Val factory had operated and still partly survives. We visited the Kakamigahara Aerospace Museum, and were again given a conducted tour by the Curator. We also visited an operational Air Force base, and were guests at the Mitsubishi Museum, where I was allowed to seat myself in the cockpit of the preserved Zero fighter there.

Also in Aichi, we were permitted to view the last surviving war memorial dedicated to the young Kamikaze pilots who, in the last days of the war, flew the Val on suicide missions against the Allied fleets, sacrificing their lives for Emperor and Nation, another unique experience.